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Abstract: This article focuses on expanding the architecture of
cooperative threat reduction for effective multilateral nuclear
nonproliferation. It assesses the risk of nuclear terrorism, the history
and main features of existing cooperative threat reduction programs,
and some of the more difficult challenges facing them. Most of the
obstacles to an effective regime of global cooperative threat
reduction are bureaucratic and inertial rather than stemming from
fundamental strategic disagreement.
In order to build a more effective global regime of cooperative
threat reduction, this article proposes five critical improvements: (1)
Additional resources; (2) Increasing deterrence through fall-out
forensics and "tagging" of radioactive isotopes and weapons-related
materials; (3) Increasing the incentive structure that convince
potential proliferators to abandon their projects; (4) Increasing highlevel engagement among nations through designation of Presidentiallevel envoys; and, (5) Expanding the umbrella of cooperative threat
reduction to include all nuclear weapons states and Pakistan in
particular.
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I. "THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE
CATASTROPHE"
We are moving aggressivelyforward... but we would
be fooling ourselves and endangeringour citizens, to
say we have done enough.
-Spencer Abraham1
Former Secretary of Energy

Speaking just days after 9/11, Mohamed El Baradei, the head of
the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"), called the
2
attacks a "wake-up call to us all. We cannot be complacent." Even
before the attacks, however, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler
reported in a well-received, bipartisan study in January 2001 that
"the most urgent, unmet national security threat to the United States
today is the danger that weapons of mass-destruction or weaponsuseable material ...

could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile

nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at
home." 3 The new reality of catastrophic domestic terrorism makes
few doubtful of the importance of reducing the threat of a nuclear
terrorist attack. The issue is compelling; in the United States it is
politically bipartisan.4 During the recent U.S. presidential election,
1. Spencer Abraham, How to Stop Nuclear Terror, WASH. POST, July 17,
2004, at A19.
2. George Bunn & Fritz Steinhausler, Guarding Nuclear Reactors and
Material from Terrorists and Thieves, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Oct. 2001), at
200
1_10/bunnoctO 1.asp.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
3. HOWARD BAKER & LLOYD CUTLER, THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A REPORT CARD ON THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY'S NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA 25 (2001) [hereinafter
REPORT CARD], available at http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
4. See Matthew Bunn & Anthony Wier, Clarifying Statements on Securing
Nuclear Materials in the Presidential Debate (Oct. 6, 2004) (unpublished paper, on
file with Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University) (reviewing President
Bush's and Senator Kerry's viewpoints on nuclear weapons during the 2004
at
available
election),
presidential
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA-content/documents/debate-nuclear-points.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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for example, both candidates agreed that the top threat facing the
United States was the prospect of weapons of mass destruction
("WMD") falling into the hands of terrorists.5
But for all the apparent agreement on eliminating the threat of
WMD, nations must do more if they are to avert a terrorist cataclysm
in a major city. Graham Allison calls the problem of nuclear
terrorism the "ultimate preventable catastrophe" because the major
powers could cooperate to reduce and eliminate the threat.6 Over the
last decade, the United States and other countries have made
significant progress in the area of cooperative threat reduction
("CTR").7 Unfortunately, these efforts have been hobbled by a lack
of capability, an absence of vision and political willpower, funding
shortfalls and internecine bureaucratic in-fighting among the major
powers.8
A. INTRODUCTORY ROADMAP
The United States' strategy to combat weapons of mass
destruction has three pillars-counter-proliferation, consequence
management and nonproliferation.9 Counter-proliferation stresses
5. See Bunn & Wier, supra note 4 (noting neither candidate disputed the fact

that large amounts of nuclear material remain unsecured around the world and that
it is vital that these stockpiles bef6re terrorists can get them).
6. See generally GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE

ULTIMATE

PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE (2004) (noting that a nuclear attack by terrorists is

avoidable if the United States takes action).

7. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

(1998) [hereinafter CTR] (describing the United States' CTR program and the
involvement of other countries), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ctr/
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
8.

See JAMES E. GOODBY ET AL., CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL

SECURITY POLICY, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FOR A NEW ERA (2004)

(discussing that the CTR program lacks the integration necessary to be most

effective), available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/CTR.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
9. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS
OF

MASS DESTRUCTION 2 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY] (explaining that
the three pillars make for a comprehensive approach in the fight against weapons
of

mass

destruction),

available

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO2/12/WMDStrategy.pdf
Apr. 8, 2005).

at
(last visited
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operational capabilities that encompass preemption, interdiction and
traditional notions of military deterrence.10 Consequence
management includes post-incident response to minimize the effect
of a WMD attack." Nonproliferation, the focus of this article,
embraces diplomacy, multilateral regimes, the control of nuclear
material and cooperative threat reduction. The IAEA and the
Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") regime traditionally have a focal
point of multilateral nonproliferation and diplomacy.
Other important multilateral nonproliferation regimes include the2
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Moreover, each component has contributed to nonproliferation and
adds value to the purposes of preventing nuclear terrorism.
Understandably, however, none has been entirely effective. 3 The
1968 NPT requires states to accept IAEA safeguards on all of their
nuclear activities. 4 The aim of the treaty is to enforce accounting and
monitoring measures designed to prevent non-nuclear weapon states
from diverting nuclear material from peaceful reactors to weapons
research programs. The safeguards were not intended to prevent theft
of nuclear fuel by disgruntled or bribed insiders, or from a

10. See id. at 2-3 (stating that counter-proliferation is essential because of the
increased likelihood that both hostile states and terrorists may acquire weapons of
mass destruction).
11. See id. at 5 (explaining that the Department of Homeland Security has
enacted numerous programs to deal with the consequences of a possible attack).
12. See e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Seeks to Curb Numbers Making Nuclear
Fuel, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 2004, at 8 (reporting that President Bush
appealed to the forty-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to sell nuclear
technology to any country that fully operated facilities to enrich uranium or
reprocess spent fuel into plutonium); see NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 5
(reviewing and supporting the multilateral nuclear nonproliferation regimes
currently in place).
13. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that no single
component is entirely effective and therefore the United States must employ a wide
range of strategies).
14. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature at London, Moscow and Washington July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 484,
729 U.N.T.S. 161, 169 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter
Nonproliferation Treaty] (holding that proliferation of nuclear weapons would
greatly increase the risk of nuclear war).

708
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paramilitary assault by outsiders. 5 A survey from Gosatomnadzor,
the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, revealed that every nuclear
theft from 1990-95 involved an insider. 6 None of the breaches in
security were detected by the safeguards in effect during that time

frame. 17
Without detracting from these existing regimes, it is important to
explore additional areas of multilateral cooperation. Although
cooperation between the United States and Russia unfolded over the
last decade, it is only in the last few years that cooperative threat
reduction has begun to attract widespread interest among other
nations. 8 We should leverage the growing interest in cooperative
threat reduction to expand the concept even further-encompassing
the entire universe of nuclear threats.
In a major speech at the National Defense University on February
11, 2004, President Bush introduced seven new proposals for
curtailing proliferation around the world.' 9 Some of the proposals
were new and some refashioned from existing initiatives.2 0 The
15. See Bunn & Steinhausler, supra note 2 (discussing that when the
safeguards were drafted, nuclear terrorism was not a perceived threat).
16. See id. at n. 1 (citing the survey and clarifying that outsiders were also often
involved).
17. See id. (noting that the safeguards were more focused on preventing nonnuclear-weapon states from diverting nuclear material to weapons programs and
not on preventing theft).
18. See Kenneth N. Luongo & William E. Hoehn III, Reform and Expansion of
Cooperative Threat Reduction, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (June 2003) (holding that
although threat reduction has faced significant challenges, in the last couple of
years there has been a trend towards making the threat reduction effort a
multilateral
effort
beyond
the
Soviet
Union),
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/luongohoehn-june03 .asp.
19. See Wade Boese, Bush Outlines Proposals to Stem Proliferation, ARMS
TODAY (Mar. 2004) (stating that President Bush's broadest proposal
called for possibly restricting states' rights to have the technology and equipment
to process uranium or plutonium that may be used for nuclear purposes), at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/Bush.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
CONTROL

20. See id. (discussing the proposals which included expanding the scope of the
proliferation security initiative (PSI); seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution
calling on all states to strengthen export controls; securing sensitive materials and
criminalizing proliferation; encouraging states to renounce uranium enrichment by
making available fuel for civilian reactors; making signature of the Additional
Protocol of the NPT a prerequisite for any nuclear imports; creating a special
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speech reiterates that there are a number of effective instruments in
the toolkit for combating WMD proliferation, and they span a range
of activities, from forceful counter-proliferation to cooperative
diplomacy and multilateral assistance."
Subparts B and C of Part I of this article glance at two of the
force-oriented concepts embedded in counter-proliferationpreemption and interdiction. 2 Preemption and interdiction have
received a vast amount of media and scholarly attention over the last
few years. Although they may have a place in a comprehensive
arsenal of counter-proliferation, they also carry significant risks.23
Often they generate negative political externalities that run counter to
American interests.24 Consequently, they should be considered only
as potential complimentary adjuncts to other initiatives such as
effective cooperative threat reduction.25 The relative prominence of
preemption and interdiction in public discourse and academia belies
their relative importance in actually controlling nuclear proliferation.
The lack of attention that cooperative threat reduction attracts is
meager compared to its importance.

committee of the IAEA Board of Governors for safeguards and verification; and
disqualifying any state currently under investigation from serving on the IAEA
Board).
21. See id. (noting that states are prepared to tighten existing regulatory
regimes that would better enable them to search ships and planes to seize illegal
weapons and missiles).
22. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C (discussing that counter-proliferation is not
as powerful a strategy as nonproliferation).
23. See Chaim Braun & Christopher F. Chyba, Proliferation Rings: New
Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 29 INT'L SECURITY 2, 49
(2004) (concluding that while preventive tactics may be important they can be very
at
available
costly),
(last
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/intemational-security/v029/29.2braun.html
visited Apr. 18, 2005).
24. See id. at 48 (stating that the United States may be deterred from engaging
in "preventive wars" due to the high costs).
25. See id. at 49 (concluding that the "silver bullet fallacy" which rejects partial
solutions to problems should be rejected because no one proposal for
nonproliferation should be used; rather a combination of strategies should be
employed).
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Consequently, cooperative threat reduction deserves much more
attention. The likely benefits from CTR promise to far exceed more
tactical and operational approaches in controlling nuclear
proliferation over the long term.26 Cooperative threat reduction is
among the most fertile and cost-effective areas for preventing a
nuclear catastrophe, and dedicating resources and energy toward
"globalizing" CTR is critically important.27 Improving cooperative
threat reduction with a sense of creativity and urgency is vital, and
this article concludes with some proposals for doing so.28
Part II discusses the chilling dangers of nuclear terrorism. 29 Today,
well-funded and well-organized terrorist groups are working to
obtain nuclear materials and to construct a nuclear weapon in order
to detonate it in a major city of a Western nation.30 There are large
amounts of unsecured highly-enriched uranium ("HEU") residing in
nuclear reactors worldwide, and the integrity of security systems at
many locations remains in question.3 Pakistan's nuclear program is

26. See Luongo & Hoehn, supra note 18 (discussing cooperative threat
reduction programs and concluding that they are very important in the fight against
weapons of mass destruction).
27. See id. (arguing for the expansion of cooperative threat reduction but
cautioning against the difficulties the United States may face in leading several
countries in a threat reduction effort).
28. See discussion infra Part V (discussing ways to achieve global cooperative
threat reduction, including increasing high level engagement and committing
additional resources to the promotion of cooperative threat reduction).
29. See discussion infra Part II (contending that unlike fusion materials, fission
materials are quite easily constructed and thereby accessible to terrorists).
30. See Nunn, Lugar: Programs to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Weapons and
Materials Must Be Accelerated, Reshaped to Meet Terrorist Threat, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12, 2003 (reporting that the terrorist group Al Qaeda had been
trying to get nuclear weapons or materials for over a decade), available at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/248-14.cfm (last visted Apr. 18, 2005).
31. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GLOBAL SECURITY FACTSHEET,
RESEARCH REACTORS FUELED BY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) (2004)

(stating that more than 100 reactors intended for research are fueled with HEU),
available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global-security/nuclear-terrorism/page.cfm?pagelD= 1379
(last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
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particularly concerning.32 Pakistan also poses another troublesome
possibility-that terrorists would obtain a functioning nuclear device
from the inventory of nascent nuclear weapons states.33
Part III introduces the original CTR program-the Nunn-Lugar
legislation.34 Within the context of threat reduction and potentially
active and purposeful proliferation, Iran and North Korea pose
special problems related to their history, geography and foreign
relations.35 Those two states deservedly have received intense
academic and media focus. 3 6 Senator Lugar includes them at the top
of his list of daunting proliferation problems for the second Bush
administration.37 The United States and its friends and allies are

32. See Braun & Chyba, supra note 23, at 9-20 (discussing the nuclear
developments and capabilities of several countries, including Pakistan, Iran, North
Korea).
33. See David Albright et al., Securing Pakistan'sNuclear Arsenal: Principles
for Assistance, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

BRIEF (2001) (explaining that Pakistan's instability makes it more likely that
nuclear weapons will fall into the wrong hands), available at http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/pakassist.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
34. See discussion infra Part III (introducing the four types of assistance
associated with cooperative threat reduction).
35. See, e.g., Braun & Chyba, supra note 23, at 9, 17 (discussing that North
Korea started reprocessing plutonium in 1989 and Iran's attempt to develop
plutonium and uranium was discovered in 1996).
36. See id. (reviewing the actions of several proliferating states, including Iran
and North Korea and stating that in order to effectively respond to the threats of
proliferation, it is necessary to understand the motivations of proliferating states
and other actors); see also Charles Recknagel, 2004 and Beyond: Iran, North

Korea Nuclear Crises Still Unresolved, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO

LIBERTY,

Dec.

16, 2004 (stating "[n]uclear proliferation was a hot issue in 2004 with world
attention focused on suspicions that both Iran and North Korea were secretly
pursuing
atomic
weapons
programs"),
available
at
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/03440b51-48ca-4bee-bce28dbe3ff451 ff.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
37. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Persistent Diplomacy Needed for
Nonproliferation Advances-Senator Lugar lists 12 items to pursue for WMD
security (Aug. 11, 2004) (describing the problems that Iran and North Korea pose
for the nonproliferation efforts of the United States, and naming other issues in the
war against proliferation such as Russian tactical nuclear weapons, containment of
weapons-grade materials outside the former Soviet Union, and destroying Russia's
chemical
weapons
arsenal),
available
at
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fashioning approaches to nonproliferation specific to these two states
of concern.38 The ever-shifting positions of those strategies lie
outside of the focus of this article. Instead, this article refers to those
two states in specific sections only as they contribute to an
understanding of the overall contours and context of globalizing
cooperative threat reduction.39
Part IV introduces cooperative threat reduction as a global
concept. 40 Rather than focusing on deliberate planning for one or two
specific states, however, a global approach to CTR emphasizes a
comprehensive and coordinated approach for locating, and securing
or destroying at-risk nuclear weapons and materials worldwide.4 The
Group of Eight ("G8") nations recently have agreed on principles of
cooperation for threat reduction. 42 To complement those efforts, G8
members successfully introduced a U.N. Security Council resolution
on controlling proliferation passed under Chapter VII.43 The G8
program is ripe for expansion and should be exploited in order to
"globalize" the cooperative threat reduction effort.

http://www.nti.org/e-research/officialdocs/dos/dosAugust2004.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005).
38. See Jennifer Loven, Bush Seeks United Front Against Iran, North Korea,
CNEws, Nov. 20, 2004 (noting that President Bush calls North Korea and Iran an
"axis of evil" and describing President Bush's efforts to rally support against the
two
nuclear
threats),
available
at
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/11/18/720263-cp.html
(last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
39. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, III.B.2, IV.B, V.A, V.B.2 (the most
urgent prerequisite for averting nuclear terrorism is effective control of fissile
material).
40. See discussion infra Part IV (describing the G8 global partnership which
has the aim of dealing with weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet
Union).
41. See discussion infra Part V (concluding that cooperative threat reduction
should be global and giving recommendations on how to achieve this).
42. See GOODBY ET AL., supra note 8, at 53 (reporting that the G8, composed
of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States, United Kingdom and
Russia, formed the Global Partnership in 2003, which committed up to $20 billion
to fund nonproliferation projects).
43. See id. (documenting that the G8 members affirmed their support for U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 at the Sea Island Summit on June of 2004).
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Part V contains concluding thoughts on how to accelerate global
CTR, prioritizing the tasks which promise to build the greatest
security in the shortest amount of time." The key to all CTR efforts
is securing international cooperation.45 Working from a multilateral
framework incurs the disadvantage inherent in multiplying the
number of competing interests at the table, but those disadvantages
are outweighed by the diplomatic power and resources the G8 and
associated states bring to the effort.46 The American military is vastly
superior to its nearest competitor, so it is tempting to downplay allied
military contributions.47 In global diplomacy, there is no such
dynamic. The American preponderance of military power can be a
powerful force for influence that helps achieve U.S. national
interests, but increasingly it is also resented and disdained, serving to
detract from fulfilling those interests. 48 In such cases, the diplomatic
contributions and "soft power" influence of friends and allies such as
the European Union is manifold.49
Operating in tandem, the great powers wield influence and
persuasion greater than the sum of their parts.5 0 It is critical that this

44. See discussion infra Part V (reiterating the urgency of the need for
cooperative threat reduction).
45. See discussion infra Part V.A (concluding that diplomacy will be the most
effective tool in achieving international cooperation).
46. See discussion infra Part V (analyzing international agreements and stating
that agreements usually face three hurdles: access, funding, and liability).
47. See Joseph J. Collins, The U.S. Military Still the Best?, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 29, 2000 (discussing that the U.S. military is the strongest in the world),
available at http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/militarystillbest.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
48. See id. (noting that the American military is also wearing thin under the
pressure of more diverse missions, including peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations).
49. See Joseph Nye, Europe's Soft Power, THE GLOBALIST, May 3, 2004
(stating that the United States has great "soft power" capability, but European soft
powers can be of great use to the United States), available at
http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3886 (last visited Apr.
8, 2005). Specifically, the author states that European diplomacy can be effective
in countering Islamic extremism. Id.
50. See id. (discussing that Al Qaeda is fighting Western not just American
powers, and that the United States and Europe can benefit from common efforts).

714
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magnifying effect be brought to bear in global cooperative threat
reduction. This article offers five proposals that can serve as a
catalyst for expanding cooperative threat reduction globally.51
First, additional resources must be poured into global CTR-not
just by the United States, which is outspending any other country,
but by nations from around the world.52 Second, deterrence structures
must be reexamined and better focused toward the nuclear terror
threat.13 Third, incentive structures must be strengthened to offer
compelling reasons for rogue states to abandon nuclear weapons
development programs and to comply with strict nuclear materials
controls.54
Fourth, the G8 states each should create a high-level official
responsible for fashioning the disparate nonproliferation programs
into a coherent package.55 The official should be able to represent
and have easy access to the Prime Minister or President in each
nation in order to apply national-level authority to rapidly achieve
breakthrough in CTR negotiations.56 In the United States, there
should be a White House envoy. 7 Finally, the umbrella of
cooperative threat reduction should be expanded to include the entire
universe of threats.58 In short, this means that we should leverage the
success experienced at the end of the Cold War with Russia under
51. See discussion infra Part V.B (concluding that cooperative threat reduction
be achieved by committing additional resources, rethinking deterrence, rethinking
incentives, increasing high-level engagement, and expanding cooperation).
52. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1 (recommending that the G8 commit
financial support to nonproliferation).
53. See discussion infra Part V.B.2 (advocating deterrence despite the erosion
of the deterrence structure in the world).
54. See discussion infra Part V.B.3 (promoting the voluntary abandonment of
nuclear development).
55. See discussion infra Part V.B.4 (discussing the great impact that one person
can have in world politics).
56. See discussion infra Part V.B.3 (dismissing the notion that adding officials
will just add another level of bureaucracy).
57. See discussion infra Part V.B.4 (stating that despite all the concerns the
White House has, adding high level engagement is very important in maintaining
national security).
58. See discussion infra Part V.B.5 (discussing the expansion of cooperative
threat reduction to countries outside of Russia and Europe).
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the Nunn-Lugar program into analogous programs for the variety of
other states with nuclear weapons or weapons programs. Like the
original Nunn-Lugar program at its inception, new thinking on this
subject may be considered radical.59 Critics will denounce it as
extending recognition and assistance to pariah states. But the
justification for assisting the Soviet Union in nuclear materials and
weapons security, accountability and control is as valid for other
states such as Pakistan, who possess at-risk weapons and nuclear
material. Obtaining the cooperation of these additional states will
require a unified vision from the G8 and its CTR partners, and the
reinforcing application of the proposals in my conclusion.
Nonproliferation seeks to interrupt nuclear plans and programs
throughout the world before they develop or evolve into a
proliferation threat.6° Prior to examining the threat of proliferation
and the specter of nuclear terrorism in Part II, it is useful to look
briefly at counter-proliferation in order to distinguish it from
nonproliferation activities.6'
Preemption and interdiction are among the most prominent
counter-proliferation concepts. 62 Both capture the value-and the

59. See Senator Dick Lugar, NUNN-LUGAR: The Past as a Guide to the
Future, Address at the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California (Dec. 13, 1999) (stating that
originally the U.S. reaction to the Nunn-Lugar project was negative, and
Americans questioned why American dollars should be committed to a program
at
available
Russia),
benefit
to
seemed
that
99
Apr.
visited
(last
1213.htm
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/news/treaty-ctr-

8, 2005).
60. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that counterproliferation is necessary despite nonproliferation efforts because it is not always
possible to prevent nuclear development).
McColl, Is Counterproliferation Compatible with
61. See Angus
Nonproliferation? Rethinking the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative,
AEROSPACE POWER J. (Spring 1997) (stating that some critics contend that

nonproliferation and counter-proliferation are incompatible and that the United
time), available at
States should not pursue both initiatives at the same
97
(last
/mccoll.html
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/spr
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
62. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 2-3 (listing the means to achieve

counter-proliferation as interdiction, deterrence, and defense and mitigation).
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limitation--of counter-proliferation, even when pursued in a
multilateral framework.63 In many situations, including a few

identified in the subsection below, counter-proliferation is essential

to avoiding the spread of dangerous weapons or materials.' In Parts
III-V, however, it will become evident that effective multilateral

nonproliferation can have an even greater impact on security and
stability.65
B. PREEMPTION
The United States went to war with Iraq in 2003, basing its
justification in part on Iraq's failure to comply with U.N. WMD
inspections.6 6 The lingering debate over jus ad bellum, the ensuing
Iraqi insurgency, and the subsequent maelstrom over the dearth of
Iraqi WMD, hang like a cloud over the U.S. doctrine of preemption.6 7
The preemption doctrine stretches the 19th century notions of
"imminent threat" and argues for an update on what constitutes the
basis for the lawful use of force.68 Detractors view it as patently

63. See id. at 2 (holding that all of the strategies used to achieve counterproliferation are necessary since prevention and containing proliferation is not
always successful).
64. See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing the interdiction of the So San).
65. See discussion infra Parts III-IV (analyzing cooperative threat reduction
and the G8 global partnership).
66. See President George W. Bush's Speech on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2003 (stating that twelve years of diplomacy with Iraq had failed in disarming
Iraq),
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0318bushstatement.ht
m (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
67. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, War With Iraq: On the Legality of
Preemption, HOOVER DIG., Spring 2003 (arguing that although the war was not
explicitly approved by the U.N. Security Council, it was legal under international
law),
available
at
http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/032/sofaer.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005);
see Paul W. Schroeder, Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War, THE AM.
CONSERVATIVE, Sept. 15, 2004 (holding that preemptive wars are usually difficult
to justify and such is the case with the war in Iraq), available at
http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
68. See YES! ONLINE, MORE ON WHAT IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE (2004) (stating
that scholars usually conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on whether or not
there
was
an
imminent
threat),
available
at
http://www.futurenet.org/article.asp?id=1055 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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unlawful.6 9 In fact, in practical application preemption appears to
mean nothing more than the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
Still, the controversy surrounding it is unlikely to dissipate soon, and
7v
legal rationales are the subject of intense debate. Debates are
unlikely to resolve much, and few disagree that in exigent
circumstances any American president would exercise preemption to
eliminate what he or she calculates to be a grave and gathering
71
danger.
Resort to preemption, however, should be a tool of last resort.
Preemption is not ideal-it comes with a high political cost, and the
action may not purchase the intended security. Consider Iran, for
example. Fareed Zakaria comments that a preemptive strike against
damage.7 1
Tehran's nuclear facilities likely would do limited physical
It could also isolate the United States and rally the Iranian population
around the mullahs.7 3 Such realities caution against a broad
application of the doctrine, and counsel to apply it sparingly. The
heated public discussion of preemption tends to overshadow these
realities, producing the perception that there is a far lower threshold
for launching preemptive attack than is actually the case. Preemption

69. See id. (discussing the Bush policy of preemption and explaining that some
scholars and other critics argue that the war on Iraq was pursued without an
imminent threat and as such it was not justified by preemption).
70. See Ben Fritz, Sorting Out the 'Imminent Threat' Debate, SPINSANITY,
Nov. 3, 2003 (examining the debate between conservatives and liberals on the
question of whether or not the Iraq situation posed an imminent threat to the
at
available
started),
war
the
before
States
United
2003
1103.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
http://www.spinsanity.org/columns/
See Ivo DAALDER, PREEMPTIVE ATTACK-OLD CONSTRAINTS, NEW
CHALLENGES, para. 2 (U.N. Global Security Initiative, short policy briefs regarding
the crisis in international security, 2004) (stating that "the promulgation of the new
doctrine leaves unaddressed profound questions of policy that its advocates have
http://www.unat
available
ignored"),
far
so
8, 2005).
Apr.
visited
(last
globalsecurity.org/pdf/Daalder-paper-preemption.pdf
72. Fareed Zakaria, Tag-Teaming the Mullahs, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004
71.

(stating that there are two approaches to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions,
at
available
engagement),
or
strikes
military
by
coercion
2005).
8,
Apr.
visited
(last
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6596808/site/newsweek/
73. See id. (discussing that a military strike against Iran may also lead to
retaliation).
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has captured the popular imagination because it promises a drama
containing the spectacular use of armed force against gathering
threats colored by legal uncertainty, but greater security is more
often generated by patient, coordinated resolve.
C. INTERDICTION

Like preemption, there is something almost prurient in the public's
anticipation of a non-permissive interdiction of a vessel or aircraft
trafficking in nuclear materials. In December 2002, for example, the
world watched as a combined U.S.-Spanish effort resulted in the
noncompliant insertion of special operations forces onto the So San,
a 3,500 ton stateless vessel floating 600 miles off the coast of
Yemen.7 4 Components for SCUD missiles from North Korea were
uncovered.7 5 The So San boarding by commandoes pre-dates the
unveiling of the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), but it has
become a symbol of the shape of proliferation security.
Many incorrectly associate The White House's PSI effort solely
with interdiction.76 The So San image has contributed to the
expectation that maritime forces will play a major role. In actuality,
maritime operations are only a small portion of interdiction, and
interdiction is only a small part of PSI. 77

The idea for PSI stemmed from the U.S. National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was published in

74. See Tony Karon, SCUD Seizure Raises Tricky Questions, TIME, Dec. 11,
2002 (stating that "maritime irregularities" such as a false manifest, the vessel's
refusal to submit itself to inspection, and papers in disorder allowed the Spanish
authorities
to
seize
the
vessel),
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,398592,00.html (last visited Apr.

8, 2005).
75. See id. (reporting that the interdicted missiles were given to Yemen).
76. See Press Release, The White House, Proliferation Security Initiative,

Statement of Interdiction Principles (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Interdiction
Principles] (explaining that the White House's PSI follows a set of interdiction
principles),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O9/20030904_1 .html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
77. See id. (describing the interdiction principles followed by the White
House's PSI, which include maritime interdiction principles as well as principles
on aircraft interdiction and other modes of transport).
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December 2002. 78 The initiative was launched by President Bush
9
during a speech in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003." Initially
bringing together eleven nations that agreed to take practical steps to
interdict shipments of WMD, the group now consists of fifteen core
8
participants including Russia. "
Beyond the core group, a variety of other nations have agreed to
cooperate with PSI states to stop the transfer of weapons or
82
material.81 Altogether, more than sixty countries are involved. The
PSI states are bound by a common Statement of Interdiction
Principles to pursue a more creative, dynamic and effective approach
to interdiction.83 The initiative is a process and set of activities, and
4
not a formal treaty organization. Consequently, the effort is not
78. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing interdiction as one
of the steps of counter-proliferation).
79. See President George W. Bush, Remarks to the People of Krakow, Poland
(May 31, 2003) (stating "the United States and a number of our close allies,
including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and
ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.
Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the
world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of
at
available
enemies."),
common
our
2005).
8,
Apr.
http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm (last visited
ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, FACT SHEET: THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
GLANCE]
INITIATIVE (PSI) AT A GLANCE, June 2004 [hereinafter PSI AT A

80. See

(reporting that the original PSI countries are Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States, and the newest members are Canada, Norway, Russia, and
Singapore), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
81. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Bolton Outlines Bush
Administration's Nonproliferation Efforts - Says Strategy Extends Beyond Rogue
States to Trade Routes, Companies (Oct. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Bolton Outlines]
transfer
(explaining that a number of countries have agreed to cooperate to stop the
20
04
/Oct!
of weapons), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/20
2005).
18,
Apr.
535618.html (last visited
82. See id. (discussing President Bush's goal to continue the expansion of the
initiative by creating numerous partnerships).
83. See Interdiction Principles, supra note 76 (discussing four interdiction
principles).
84. See PSI AT A GLANCE, supra note 80 (explaining that the PSI initiative is
an informal agreement between countries that does not vest any additional
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distracted by budgets, agendas, meetings, or candidacies for
organizational office, and the like. The PSI states pledge to take steps
to prevent and interdict the transfer or transport of WMD by states
and non-state actors. 5
Participants have conducted numerous exercises, met multiple
times to discuss operational and legal aspects of interdiction, and to
consider new partner nations.16
Working to integrate and streamline command and control, share
intelligence and develop operational responses, PSI partners seek to
enhance their tactical, programmatic and legislative approaches to
proliferation.87 The states also plan to take specific steps to interdict
WMD when they have been alerted or receive a valid request from a
PSI partner.88 The process is aimed at generating a dense and
effective network of laws, regulations and rehearsed responses to
ensnare WMD smuggling.89
About eighty states have expressed interest in PSI, but in order to
be part of the process, states must have the willingness and the
capability to uphold the Statement of Interdiction Principles. 90 This
caveat retains the integrity of PSI, and provides important lessons for
the major powers in thinking about how to expand cooperative threat
reduction. New states should be welcomed into the process, but they
should not be permitted to dilute fundamental principles of
cooperative threat reduction.
authority on the countries that joined and does not entitle the countries to do
anything they could not previously do).
85. See id. (asking countries to act together to stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems and related materials).
86. See id. (giving mock ship boarding as an example of an exercise the PSI
has conducted).
87. See Interdiction Principles, supra note 76 (calling for streamlined

procedures for information exchange, strengthening of international law to
accomplish

interdiction

interdiction).

objectives,

and other

specific

action

supporting

88. See id. (committing to act on the request of another state where good cause
is shown by the other state).
89. See id. (explaining that the PSI builds on previous efforts made by the

international community).

90. See PSI AT A GLANCE, supra note 80 (stating that the original participations
set forth eleven principles that members must abide by).
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The interdiction of WMD in transit is a critical piece of the
comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, and PSI has received a
91
tremendous amount of media coverage since its inception. One
notable success, for example, was the interception of the BBC China,
92 Like
which was transporting nuclear components to Libya.
preemption, one of the public's attractions to PSI is that it seems to
offer exciting, operational "take-downs," particularly through
noncompliant boarding on the high seas. Of course, the bulk of PSI's
work is quiet and methodic-separated from the world of highpaced, real-time operations.
Even more important than preemption and operational interdiction,
however, are U.S. and international cooperative threat reduction
programs. These programs can reduce and even eliminate the chance
93
that WMD weapons and related material enter the transit stream.
Unlike preemption and interdiction, CTR lacks thrill and animation,
but it is potentially a far more important mechanism for preventing
nuclear terrorism.

91. See id. (discussing the PSI interdiction in October 2003 of a vessel that was
headed towards Libya).
92. See Bolton Outlines, supra note 81 (noting that the interdiction was a great
success given the infancy of the PSI).
93. See GOODBY ET AL., supra note 8, at Introduction (explaining that the
original CTR program, the Nunn-Lugar CTR, was the first to work towards

securing and eliminating nuclear weapons).
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II. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
We cannot fully rule out the possibility that fissile
material ...
terrorists.

may fall into the hands of international
-Alexander Rumyantsev
Minister, Russian Federation for Atomic Energy 94

Most of the world's terrorist groups have specific and typically
local political demands.95 Often their primary goal is to rearrange the
regional political map.96 The Basque Fatherland and Liberty ("ETA")
group, which has spread terrorist violence in Northern Spain and
Southwestern France since its founding in 1959, is one such
conventional terrorist organization.97 Groups like the ETA likely
would not employ a nuclear weapon, even if it had one.98 In fact,
94. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DAILY OPEN SOURCE INFRASTRUCTURE
REP.

FOR

21

SEPTEMBER

2004

12,

available

http://www.cargosecurity.con/ncsc/ncsc dotnet/uploads/DHSIAIPDaily.200409-21.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).

at

95. See BOAZ GANOR, TERROR AS A STRATEGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE,

(International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, policy paper, Jul. 15, 2002)
(studying terrorism and concluding that terrorists differ from common criminals in
that
terrorists
are
motivated
by political
goals),
available at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=443 (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
96. See e.g. FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE PROGRAM,
BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY (ETA) (describing ETA as a terrorist

organization founded in 1959 with the aim of bringing independence to several
northern
Spanish
provinces),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/eta.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005); see GANOR,
supra note 95 (stating that terrorists attempt to change the political agenda of a
population through indiscriminate attacks).
97. See Seven Bombs Across Spain Injure Five in Reminder of Basque
Separatists,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 6, 2004 (describing the terrorist attack
led by ETA that injured five people in Spain); see also Todd Richissin, Millions in
Spain Protest Attacks, BALT. SUN, Mar. 13, 2004, at Al (stating that ETA denied

involvement of the group in the catastrophic March 11, 2004 attack on a Madrid
train system).

98. See RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK 30-31
(1998) (stating the reasons why most non-state actors are not interested in weapons
of mass destruction).
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there are very few instances of terrorist groups attempting to use a
functional nuclear, chemical or biological weapon. 99
The most prominent example of a terrorist WMD attack occurred
in 1995 in Tokyo. During one morning in early March, the Aum
100
Shinrikyo cult used sarin gas on at least four trains. Commuters
packed on trains traveling on the Hibiya Line and two other lines of
the Tokyo subway system were exposed.' Although only a handful
of people were killed, there is mounting concern that the attacks
the future. 10 2
presage an even more devastating terror attack in
Psychologically, the rather ineffective chemical attack in Japan has
to be understood against the backdrop of 9/11 and the terrorist attack
against the Madrid train system. Al Qaeda or some other related
global extremist group could be capable of launching a catastrophic
10 3
attack; the most haunting scenario is a nuclear attack. One Al
Qaeda spokesman, Suleiman Abu Gheith, argues that the group has a
right to kill up to 4 million Americans in retaliation for deaths it
14
claims Israel has inflicted on Muslims. Osama bin Laden also has
105
expressed interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
99. See id. at 31 (asserting that Aum Shinrikyo is the only non-state actor that
has ever used biological or chemical weapons, and no non-state actor has ever used
nuclear weapons).
100. See Paul Blustein, Gas Attack Kills Tokyo Commuters; 6 Die, Hundreds
Hurt As Subway PassengersFlee Trains, Stations, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1995, at
Al (holding that terrorism attacks like the sarin gas attack were virtually unheard
of in Japan before that episode).
101. See id. (reporting that over 1,500 people were injured during the attack).
102. See Linda Sieg, Japan's 1995 Sarin Attack May Foreshadow Future,
REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2001 (discussing that the Tokyo attacks may be only the
beginning of an era of biological and chemical weapons terrorism), available at
01
.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
http://www.cesnur.org/200I/aum-sept
103. See I-wei J. Chang, Nuclear Terrorism Realities; Report Urges Security,
Ending Production to Prevent Atomic 9/11, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A13
(describing a report done by the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace that
studied the threat of nuclear terrorism and the catastrophe that could result if
terrorists got nuclear weapons).
104. See Suleiman Abu Gheith, 'Why We Fight America': Al Qa 'ida Spokesman
Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million Americans with
Weapons of Mass Destruction, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RES. INST. SPECIAL DISPATCH
No. 388, June 12, 2002 (giving an Anti-American speech and justifying the attacks
of September 11 because of America's policy of suppression), available at
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This commitment reflects what a Rand Corporation study called
the "inexorable escalation" of terrorist goals over the last decade. 106
Those goals now include the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 10 7 This
raises the specter of a blind-side nuclear terrorist attack-an attack
against a major city that cannot be attributed to any state or terrorist
group. There is no nation or group that accepts responsibility. This
scenario is in many ways worse than the "bolt out of the blue" first
strike scenarios that worried strategic thinkers during the Cold War.
In the case of a Soviet attack, the USSR was subject to retaliation,
and therefore, deterrence. 108
Today, the key to preventing a nuclear catastrophe is preventing
terrorists from obtaining a pre-constructed nuclear device, or
obtaining fissile material in order to construct a home-made weapon.
To complicate the challenge, no one is certain how terrorist groups
and states interface, and concern over their cooperation extends not
just to states on the terrorist-sponsor list, such as Iran, but to other
nations seeking to become a nuclear weapons power.109 There is a
long list of countries rumored to be seeking an organic nuclear
capability, and they range from the usual suspects, to more
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP38802
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
105. See Chang, supra note 103 (discussing that while terrorists may not have
nuclear capabilities, they may be able to get them from other countries).
106. BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, COUNTERING AL QAEDA 14 (2002) (stating that
there is no inexorable escalation from truck bombs to weapons of mass
destruction).
107. See id. (discussing that Al Qaeda is looking to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and that if Al Qaeda acquired these, they would likely use them).
108. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., MODERNIZING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES: THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES xvi (1983) (explaining the
Reagan Administration's comprehensive review of strategic triad in October 1981
which intended to overcome a "bolt out of the blue" attack by Soviet Union); see
also NIKOLAI SOKOV, THE AGENDA FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER
THE MOSCOW TREATY (Monterey Institute of International Studies, policy paper,
Oct. 2002) (discussing that before the end of the Cold War the notion of mutual
assured destruction that existed between the United States and Russia was replaced
with deterrence and the fear of unacceptable damage), available at
http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm-0278.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
109. See Braun & Chyba, supra note 23, at 9-20 (reviewing the countries that
are interested in developing weapons of mass destruction).
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amorphous seekers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.11° It is unclear how
much secondary aspirants could assist terrorist organizations in
constructing a bomb."'
A. FIsSILE MATERIAL AND NON-STATE ACTORS
Fortunately,

a

fusion

weapon-a

hydrogen

bomb-is

quite

difficult to construct. The obstacles for designing a successful fusion
112 A fission
bomb are likely insurmountable for a terrorist group.

weapon, on the other hand, is relatively simple. With access to the
appropriate material, assembling a nuclear explosive device in the
downtown section of any major city and then detonating it could

render horrifying consequences.113
The primary obstacle to constructing a fission device is obtaining
fissile material, such as HEU, an enriched form of uranium. 1 4
Naturally-occurring uranium consists of U-238, while the material
needed to sustain a chain reaction in a nuclear bomb is the fissile
110. See Ewen MacAskill & Ian Traynor, Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 18, 2003 (explaining that Saudi Arabia was contemplating one of

three options: acquiring a nuclear capability, maintaining an alliance with a nuclear
power, or reaching a regional agreement for a nuclear-free Middle East), available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/saudi/story/0,11599,1044402,00.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005); see also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., MAKING THE
NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

IN COUNTERING

TERRORISM 39 (National Academy of Sciences ed., The National Academy Press
2002) [hereinafter NATION SAFER] (listing several countries that could potentially
turn over nuclear weapons to terrorists), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/stct
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
111. See NATION SAFER, supra note 110, at 40 (discussing the ways nuclear
weapons can get into the hands of terrorists, such as theft or diversion).
112. See generally THE NUCLEAR WEAPON ARCHIVE, ENGINEERING AND DESIGN
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (stating that in addition

to the cost and difficultly of designing nuclear bombs, the inability to test these
weapons make some options, like fusion boosting, "infeasible"), available at
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
113. See Jeffrey Boutwell et al., Nuclear Terrorism: The Danger of Highly
Enriched Uranum (HEU), 2 PUGWASH ISSUE BRIEF 1, 2 (2002) (citing opinions by
numerous nuclear weapons experts on the large-scale damage that a nuclear bomb
could do).
114. See NATION SAFER, supra note 110, at 39 (indicating that stolen plutonium
and enriched HEU are threats to security due to the nuclear devices that can be
fashioned by these materials).
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isotope U-235."15 HEU is uranium enriched to over 20%, but

weapons-grade uranium starts at 80% enrichment for the U-235
isotope. 1 6 Plutonium is more difficult to initiate a chain reaction, so
HEU poses the greatest danger because it is the easiest material in
7
the world from which to construct a bomb."
Forty-six nations around the globe possess weapons-usable
uranium." 8 Approximately twenty metric tons of HEU serves as fuel
for more than 130 civilian research reactors around the world,

located in over 40 nations. 1 9 Among these reactors, dozens possess

enough fuel for a nuclear weapon. 21 In addition to the United States,
a number of other countries, including Pakistan, India, Israel, France,
South Africa, the United Kingdom and China, possess quantities of

115. See Boutwell, supra note 113, at 3-4 (explaining that in order to produce
weapons-grade HEU, the percentage of U-235 needs to be about 90% or higher,
but any enrichment above 20% is considered weapons-usable).
116. See id. (noting that while both are expensive and technically challenging,
the enrichment process separates the required quantity of U-238 so that the
proportion of U-235 increases accordingly).
117. See id. (quoting Nobel-prize winning physicist Luis W. Alvarez, "Most
people seem unaware that if separated U-235 is at hand, it's a trivial job to set off a
nuclear explosion, whereas if only plutonium is available, making it explode is the
most difficult technical job I know").
118. See GEORGE PERKOVICH ET AL., UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A STRATEGY

FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY 45-46 (2004) (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace ed., draft report, June 2004) (advocating that countries possessing nuclear
weapons should bow to requirements for nuclear security standards), available at
http://wmd.ceip.matrixgroup.net/UniversalCompliance.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
119. See id. at 51 (commenting on U.S. opposition to use of HEU in research
reactors but noting that their efforts to combat such use is moving too slowly).
Perkovich calls for increased investment in development of new fuel sources,
mandatory conversions and shut-downs of HEU research reactor sites, and
repatriation of al U.S.-origin HEU to the U.S. for disposal as examples of a more
"aggressive and comprehensive" approach to ending HEU use. Id.
120. See MATTHEW BUNN & ANTHONY WIER, SECURING THE BOMB: AN
AGENDA FOR ACTION (Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, May 2004) (noting that research-reactor fuel elements are small enough
to put into a backpack and can be processed to extract HEU relatively easily),
available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/analysis-cnwmupdate_052404.pdf (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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HEU.'2 ' Japan and Germany possess several metric tons of
plutonium as a by-product of civilian reactors, and it is likely122that
North Korea possesses weapons-useable amounts of plutonium.
Countries possessing fissile material must take precautions to
avoid theft. The most effective strategy is total elimination through
down-blending the material to low-enriched uranium, or to cabin it in
highly fortified facilities located in stable countries. 23 It is enough to
de-enrich HEU to less than 20%, or U-235, so that it cannot be used
to initiate a chain reaction. The process of de-enrichment is easily
accomplished by a nuclear-weapons state, but impossible for a
terrorist group to reverse. 2 4 Because HEU is strewn throughout the
world, standardizing protection and accounting processes are
challenging.
Given a sufficient amount of HEU, it is not only fairly simple to
construct a nuclear device, but possible to do so in a very short
amount of time. 1 5 Indeed, thirty years ago the Office of Technology
Assessment concluded:
[A] small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the
classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear
explosive device. They would not necessarily require a great deal of

121. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 46 (urging development of an
international nuclear rapid response force among those nations).
122. See id. at 7 (providing a chart detailing information on various countries'

total nuclear weapons, amount of HEU and amount of plutonium).
123. See id. at 5 (discussing that because HEU is susceptible to theft due to
difficulties with precise accounting, elimination is an effective strategy).

124. See id. (noting that because Russia and the United States possess more
HEU than they could use for nuclear weapons, elimination has been an option that
is politically possible).
125. OFFICE OF SECURITY AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SECURITY MANUAL FOR
PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS ch. 1,

3.a. 1 (1994) (stating that detonating a nuclear explosion using HEU plausibly can
be done in such a short amount of time that DOE internal security regulations are
targeted at keeping terrorists out of U.S. nuclear sites completely rather than trying
to catch them as they leave the site, for fear the terrorists would have an
"unauthorized opportunity . . . to use available nuclear materials for onsite
available at
device"),
nuclear
improvised
an
of
assembly
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/doe/o563 2_1c.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
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technological equipment or have to undertake any experiments. Only
modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without
arousing suspicion would be required. The financial resources for
on open markets need not exceed a
acquisition of necessary equipment
26
fraction of a million dollars. 1

The prevalence of nuclear weapons programs, combined with state
sponsorship of terrorism or terrorist activity, increases the risk that
weapons-usable material could fall into the hands of terrorists.
B. JUXTAPOSING STATE SPONSORS AND NUCLEAR SECURITY

There is no longer doubt that Tehran pursued a clandestine nuclear
program, contrary to its obligations under the NPT.127 Moreover, the
U.S. Department of State labeled Iran among the most active state
sponsors of terrorism in the world. 128 Iran could possess the ability to
construct nuclear weapons if it is successful in its pursuit of an
indigenous HEU fuel cycle.129 Similarly, North Korea is a danger and
likely already has an atomic bomb. 130 Although there are no known
North Korean-sponsored terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean

126.

OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND

140 (1977), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byterserv.prl/-ota/disk3/1977/7705_n.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
127. See Letter from Stanley K. Moskowitz, Director of Cong. Aff., Central
Intelligence Agency, to the Honorable Bob Graham, Chairman of the Select
Comm. on Intelligence ("CIA Answers to Questions for the Record: Worldwide
Threat Briefing 2002"),
2 (Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter "CIA Threat Briefing
2002"] (stating that Iranian leaders view ballistic missiles as paramount to their
at
as
a
regime),
available
security
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/020602cia.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
SAFEGUARDS

128. See OFF. OF THE COORDINATOR OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003: OVERVIEW OF STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM (2004) [hereinafter PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM] (reporting that

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and
Security supported, trained and funded various terrorist groups and their actions,
including high-profile support and calls for anti-Israel actions), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
129. See Boutwell, supra note 113, at 4 (relaying that with HEU constructing a
fission bomb may prove a feasible task).
130. See James Brooke & David E. Sanger, North Koreans Say They Hold
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005 (reporting that for the first time, North
Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons).
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airlines flight in 1987, Kim Jong II publicly acknowledged in 2002
that DPRK special forces kidnapped Japanese citizens.'3 1 Like Iran,
the prospect of a nuclear North Korea is disturbing because of the
potential for the smuggling of weapons and HEU.
The next greatest threat to proliferation does not appear to be a
designated state sponsor, but nuclear-armed Pakistan, a state with a
high level of terrorist activity on its soil. 13 2 India and Israel also have
nuclear weapons and high levels of terrorism within their territory,
but there exists a higher degree of confidence in their ability to
safeguard their nuclear arsenals. Other countries such as South
Africa, with fairly low levels of terrorist activity, are targets
nevertheless due to their possession of HEU. 13 3 IAEA safeguards
protect the HEU in Pretoria, South Africa, but many regard those
standards as insufficient.
These states provide an entry point for potential terrorists. In many
instances, nuclear facilities are remote and well-protected, as is the
case with Israel and North Korea. However, opportunities exist for
passing nuclear material and equipment in each of these states.
Russia, for example, experienced lapses in safeguarding, which
resulted in a documented sixteen seizures of weapons-usable material
since 1992.134 These seizures raised concern about black market

131. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 128 (noting that after
September 11, North Korea took a new approach towards terrorism, including
working with Japan to correct the hostage situation).
132. See PAUL LEVENTHAL & BRAHMA CHELLANEY, NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THREAT, PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE IN SOUTH

ASIA (1988) (summarizing terrorist activities in Pakistan and reporting that in
1987, 17% of the 832 international terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan),
available at http://www.nci.org/p/pl-bc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
133. See SHARON SQUASSONI, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, GLOBALIZING
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: A SURVEY OF OPTIONS CRS-11 (2004)
available at
(asserting that security can mitigate this concern),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
134. See Russia Reportedly Admits to Reactor, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at
A27 (conveying that plutonium seized in Germany originated from a Moscow
nuclear reactor in 1994).
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activity and transfer to terrorists, but the CIA found these cases
involved only opportunistic thieves with no prearranged buyers.135
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1: NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND TERRORISM

Terrorists may also try to steal a completed atomic bomb. There

are approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the

135. See "CIA Threat Briefing 2002," supra note 127, 29 (stating that Russia
views weapon sales as a major source of income, and their government's ability
and commitment to curb proliferation in such dealings remains a concern).
136. See DIRECTOR OF CENT. INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING To WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, 1 July Through
31 December 2003, 4 (relaying that Libya renounced its WMD program on
December 19, 2003, and now provides open access to its WMD facilities to
inspectors, including ten sites connected to Libyan nuclear activities), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report-july-dec2003.pdf (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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major nuclear powers, most of which belong to the United States and
Russia. 37 As mentioned, the likelihood of nuclear weapons theft in
Israel and India is also rather low. The superpower weapons are
relatively well-protected against theft and diversion.'38 Many,
however, believe some weapons in39Russia are not beyond the
capacity of a terrorist group to obtain.1
Russia and Pakistan appear particularly vulnerable to nuclear
weapons theft. Russia experienced several incidents of theft
regarding weapons-usable material, and while these seizures did not
involve terrorists, there have been several highly-coordinated attacks
by terrorist groups in recent history in Russia. In 1996, Chechen
rebels held 2,000 people hostage at a hospital in Dagestan and
ignited a gun battle. 14 Six years later, fifty heavily-armed insurgents
operating 1,000 miles from their base held 700 people hostage at a
Moscow theater.' 4' Dozens of Muslim guerillas seized more than
1,000 hostages in a two-day battle at a school in Beslan, Russia in

137. See Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Stockpiles,

1945-2002,

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,

Nov./Dec. 2002, at 58-6

(commenting that since the end of the Cold War, most of the U.S. and Russia's
available at
non-operational),
made
been
have
weapons
nuclear
Apr. 8,
visited
(last
d02norris
http://www.thebulletin.org/article-nn.php?art-offni

2005).
138. See DEP'T. OF DEFENSE, SECURITY POLICY FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, DIRECTIVE 5210.14 4.3 (1988) (detailing the factors to be taken into

account when assessing the protection of nuclear weapons in the U.S. including:
"their location, the configuration in which they are maintained, the nature and
capabilities of potentially hostile forces, and the reliability and capabilities of
personnel responsible for working with or protecting them"), available at
52
10_41.htm (last visited
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod!doddApr. 8, 2005).

139. See "CIA Threat Briefing 2002," supra note 127, 29 (noting that as of
2002, Russian safeguards for its nuclear stockpile remained uneven despite of
improvements made with the United States' assistance).
140. See Peter Baker & Susan B. Glasser, Chechen Rebels Issue Threat, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at Al (describing one of the conflicts between Russia and
Chechnya which make some uneasy about the security of Russia's nuclear
weapons).

141. See id. (reporting on the tense hostage situation caused by terrorists
demanding Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya).
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September, 2004.142 In each instance, a number of the terrorist
insurgents escaped. Although Pakistan has yet to suffer a single,
dramatic mega-attack on the scale of the ones in Russia, the risk in
that country is even greater.
Unlike Russia, Pakistan has a deep well of jihad sympathy, and
many in the region incorporated Pakistan's nuclear status into their
faith and ideology. 143 Extremists are everywhere in Pakistan-in the
madrasses (Islamic schools), the military, the Inter-Services
Intelligence ("ISI") agency and the general public. Repeated
assassination attempts against President Musharraf, A.Q. Khan's
forthright nuclear assistance to North Korea, Iran and Libya, 144 as
well as an on-going terrorist insurgency with connections to Al
Qaeda all raise questions about the integrity of Pakistan's nuclear
45
weapon security. 1
The instability surrounding nuclear weapons and materials, and
the strength of potential terror-thieves made it imperative to reduce
the threat. The first prescient effort was the U.S.-Russian venture
funded by the Nunn-Lugar Act and managed by the Department of

142. See Peter Baker & Susan B. Glasser, Hundreds Left Dead in Russian

School Siege, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, at Al (relaying that hundreds of people
died in this attack, which involved hostages, the majority of whom were children).
143. See Mohammad Kamran, MMA Vows to Wage Jihadfor Kashmir and NDefence, DAILY TIMES (PAKISTAN), June 2, 2004, at 7-8 (stating that the MMA's

leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, accused the U.S. of trying to disarm Muslim states
and criticized Pakistan's government for complying), available at
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story-6-2-2004_pg7-8
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
144. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133, at CRS-13 (relaying that such dealings
raise the question of whether or not the international community should control
certain materials or completely ban them).
145. See M.V. Ramana & A.H. Nayyar, India,Pakistanand the Bomb, ScI. AM.,

Dec. 2001, at 72 (noting that Musharraf cited "safety of nuclear missiles" as a
priority),

available

at

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?collD= 1&articlelD=00087D79-AA4B- 1C6E84A9809EC588EF21 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005); see generally Jessica Stem,
Pakistan's Jihad Culture, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 115 (2000) (indicating that President
Musharraf continues in the government's attempts to "rein in terrorist groups,"
with such programs as "deweaponization"). Stem also discusses the role of
madrasses in spreading extremist ideologies. Id.

2005]

A VER TING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Defense. 14 6 Part III discusses this Act, as well as the Department of
Energy's new counterpart program, the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative ("GTRI").

III. THE INCEPTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION
Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a
small result, it produces no result at all.
-John

Stuart Mill

Cooperative threat reduction involves four types of assistanceweapons security, site security, material security and personnel
security. 147 Weapons security focuses on improving the chain of
command and enhancing custody and control features for the storage
4
and transportation of nuclear weapons. 1 States other than Russia are
unlikely to have large numbers of weapons, and assistance to those
49
nations outside of the NPT is likely to be controversial. Also there
may be difficulty in getting the cooperation of peripheral nuclear
weapon states. Site security includes enforcing perimeter measures,
such as gates, barbed wire barriers, personnel identification systems
and sensors to detect unauthorized tampering or movement of
weapons or materials.

146. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 211(a), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2551 (1991), Pub. L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691, codified as amended by the
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 5901 (1996)
(setting forth the purpose of this Act as Russia's request for U.S. aid in dismantling
their nuclear weapons for the sake of security, international stability and
nonproliferation).
147. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133, at CRS-13 n.44 (illustrating that CTR
passed as an amendment of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, P.L.
102-228, and is called the "Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991").
148. See id. at 15 (noting that scenarios like the U.S. and Russia's disarmament
will not likely occur again, as few countries are as heavily armed as Russia).
149. See id. (listing the differences that CTR faces from the Russian
disarmament model as "(1) not all of the countries of concern here have actual
weapons; (2) some that do have weapons programs belong to treaties that they may
be currently violating; and (3) others that have weapons programs have no
international restrictions on them and may not have any interest in giving up their
weapons").
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Material security, a primary mission of the Department of Energy
("DOE"), involves removing material such as HEU from at-risk
countries like Georgia, down-blending HEU to low-enriched
uranium ("LEU") so it cannot be used to construct a weapon, and
identifying permanent storage locations, especially for plutonium.
Material security also involves segregating and tracking legitimate
nuclear materials. Overall, there should be robust and standardized
nuclear material protection, control and accounting ("MPCA")
procedures. 15 0 Nuclear safeguards rely on state systems of accounting
and control ("SSACs") to measure physical inventories of sensitive
material.' 5 ' Finally, personnel security involves the recognition that
scientists and other specialists in Russia, Iraq and other states
sometimes live in unstable environments of poverty and chaos.
Providing them with alternative, well-paying and meaningful
technical work is critical to fencing their expertise and keeping them
from dealing in the black market. 52
A. NUNN-LUGAR: FROM INCEPTION TO EXPANSION
The original Nunn-Lugar legislation passed in 1991, less than one
month before the break-up of the USSR.'53 During this period,
countries feared the unraveling of the Soviet Union's nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons infrastructure. 5 4 Originally funded
at $400 million, the law aimed to help Russia meet its START

150. See id. at 17 (quoting President Bush's proposal that nations "establish
sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic engineering of
pathogenic organisms").
151. See id. at 16 n.46 (indicating that states are required to establish such a
system under CWC and be subject to inspections).
152. See id. at 17 (commenting on U.S. programs which provide funding for
grants to these scientists).
153. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 211(a), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2551 (1991), Pub. L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691, codified as amended by the
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 5901 (1996)
(indicating the importance of the bill for the United States in order to prevent
proliferation).
154. See id. (listing the three types of danger posed by events in the U.S. as:
possession of WMD by successor entities not conducive to international safety,
seizure, theft, sale or use of such weapons, and contribution to proliferation).
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55
obligations by reducing its inventory of strategic nuclear weapons.'
By late 2004, this amounted to a cumulative reduction of more than
hundreds of bomber aircraft and nearly
6,300 nuclear warheads,
56
1
thirty submarines.

Nunn-Lugar addressed three principle threats-substandard
materials protection and accounting, smuggling of nuclear weapons
and components, and the transfer of actual weapons, components and
To address these threats, the
weapons-related knowledge.15
legislation facilitated, on a prioritized basis, the transportation,
storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear weapons in the
states of the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the legislation
operated through a series of complex bilateral agreements between
the United States and the states of the Former Soviet Union.
In October 1992, the Safe and Secure Dismantlement ("SSD")
talks, a component of the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act
58
("FSUDA"), proposed an additional $400 million.' Allocation of
funds, however, were contingent upon U.S. presidential certification
that recipient states adhere to the elements of a six-part checklist:

REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NONPROLIFERATION AND
U.S. PROGRAMS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
ASSISTANCE:
REDUCTION
THREAT

155.

Amy Woolf, CRS

CRS-3 (updated 2005) (noting that the legislation was intended to assist the Soviet
Union and its "successor entities " to "' 1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical
weapons, and other weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in
connection with their destruction; and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the
proliferation of such weapons"').
156. See Richard G. Lugar, Committed to Containing Nukes, WASH. POST, Oct.
23, 2004, at A23 (indicating that this program also contributed to employment of
"weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits" and additional security).
157. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 212(b) (stating "[s]uch
cooperation may involve assistance in planning and in resolving technical
problems associated with weapons destruction and proliferation. Such cooperation
may also involve the funding of critical short-term requirements related to
weapons destruction and should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United States
technology and United States technicians").
158. See James Clay Moltz, Introduction: Assessing United States
7
States,
Newly-Independent
the
to
Assistance
Nonproliferation
continues
Congress
that
(noting
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 55, 56 (2000)

$400 million per year),
supporting programs created by this bill for approximately
7
availableat http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vo107/71/intro l.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
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Making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or
destroying such weapons;
Forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate
defense requirements, and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons
of mass destruction;
Forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed
nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
Facilitating the United States' verification of weapons destruction;
Complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and,
Observing internationally recognized human rights standards, including
1 59
the protection of minorities.

This checklist raised the bar on achieving the "cooperative" aspect
of the program, and made certification difficult. A recent amendment
to the law, however, provides the President with authority to waive
these provisions for national security interests of the United States.1 60
Success depends on the collaboration of foreign governments; the
support of their military and nuclear officials; and partner nation
openness and access to sensitive facilities. The participation of
officials in the transportation of significant amounts of nuclear
materials and related components is also essential.
The Department of Defense's ("DOD") Defense Threat Reduction
1 61
Agency, created in 1998, manages and implements CTR programs.

159. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 211 (b)(l)-(6).
160. See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush, for the Secretary
of State, Presidential Determination No. 2004-08: Memorandum on Waiver of
Restrictions on Assistance to Russia Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act
of 1993, 39 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1560, Nov. 10,
2003 (waiving, officially, those restrictions placed on the President), available at
http://www.vote-smart.org/speech-detail.php?speech id=24502 (last visited Apr.
18, 2005); see National Defense Authorization Act FY 2003, P.L. 107-314 (2002)
§ 1306(a)-(b) (stating the President may waive restrictions of the Act); see also
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5951-5958 (2002)
(setting forth the process by which the President submits a waiver to Congress).
161. See DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, ABOUT DTRA (stating
DTRA's four major functions: combat support, technology development, threat
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The objectives of CTR are broader than initially envisioned under
Nunn-Lugar. They include destruction or dismantlement of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, delivery systems and related
and
infrastructure, consolidation of WMD-related technology
1 62
proliferation.
against
safeguards
materials, and establishing
Russia receives the most Nunn-Lugar funding thus far, which has
resulted in significant progress in the elimination of large numbers of
nuclear weapons, successful training of nuclear custodians in
technology-based systems of material protection, control and
accounting, and the destruction of toxic fuels and nuclear delivery
vehicles. 63 The Nunn-Lugar statute removed more nuclear weapons
from service in the Former Soviet Union than are in the current
combined.161
stockpiles of China, France and the United Kingdom
The program expanded from its original focus to sponsor a variety
of projects with the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Ukraine and Uzbekistan. One of the primary
accomplishments of U.S. nonproliferation and dismantlement
assistance is funding the removal of weapons, silos and delivery
vehicles and the conversion of facilities into peaceful purposes in
1 65
In 1996, the last nuclear
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
returned to Russia. These
republics
warheads from the former Soviet
three former nuclear states are now nuclear-free, and agreed to
accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Such a transition
could not succeed without Nunn-Lugar.

control and threat reduction), at http://www.dtra.mil/about/index.cfimn (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
162. See 22 U.S.C. § 5952(b) (listing the authorized programs that the President

may use in assisting the former Soviet Union dismantle its nuclear arsenal).

163. See Moltz, supra note 158, at 56 (relaying that these programs also greatly

assisted in the nuclear disarmament of Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine).

164. See id. (conveying that as of December of 1999, this program deactivated 4,

854 nuclear warheads, in addition to destruction of hundreds of other nuclear

related weapons and launchers).
165. See Luongo & Hoen, supra note 18 (mentioning that programs in these
countries also included alternative employment for those individuals whose careers
relied on nuclear weapons).
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Nunn-Lugar-expanded in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004-was signed into law in 2003 to "assist the
United States in resolution of critical emerging proliferation threats"
and to permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to
achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals. 66 The law permits the
President to spend $50 million of the program's funds outside the
Former Soviet Union to safeguard proliferation threats in any
country. 167 In doing so, the President must determine that the projects
requiring money help the United States resolve critical emerging
proliferation threats, or to achieve long-standing nonproliferation
goals. The President must notify Congress ten days after obligating
such funds. 16 Recently the program guarded and then destroyed a
chemical weapons stockpile in Albania, after Tirana appealed for
assistance in dealing with the hazard. 169 Potential proposals now
include retraining weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya.
B. GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE

The DOE established a complementary program entitled the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative ("GTRI"). 17 ° Secretary of Energy
Abraham launched the GTRI before the delegates of the IAEA on
May 26, 2004, with a primary mission to remove and secure as
expeditiously as possible all high-risk nuclear materials and

166. National Defense Authorization Act FY 2004, P.L. 108-36 (2003), 117
Stat. 1392, § 1308 (a)-(c) (stating that the President may obligate no more than
$50 million per year for CTR activities outside the Former Soviet Union).
167. See id. § 1308(b)-(c) (establishing that the President may use funds to
provide equipment and services but not cash directly).
168. See id. § 1308(d)(2) (declaring that this notification must accompany a
justification and description of scope and duration of the project).
169. See Lugar, supra note 156 (praising the work President Bush's
administration achieved in dismantling via the Nunn-Lugar Act thus far, and
stating that they recruited more than sixty countries for their Proliferation Security
Initiative and thus betting the U.S.' "ability to interdict shipment related to
WMD").
170. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE
HIGHLIGHTS [hereinafter INITIATIVE HIGHLIGHTS] (discussing the program's goals,

approach to nuclear arms reductions, and affiliation with other ongoing arms
reduction
programs),
available
at
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/264200491138_ViennaGTRFa
ct%20SheetFINAL1_052604%20.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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equipment from around the world. Conducted in close cooperation
with the IAEA and other international partners, the initiative focuses
on four primary tasks: (1) to repatriate Russian-origin fresh HEU by
the end of 2005 and complete repatriation of all Russian-origin spent
fuel by 2010; (2) to accelerate repatriation of U.S.-origin research
reactor spent fuel throughout the world within a decade; (3) to
convert civilian research reactor cores that use HEU to LEU; and, (4)
to expand the program to cover other nuclear and radiological
materials that remain outside existing cooperative threat reduction
regimes. "' To accomplish this final end, officials plan to conduct
vulnerability assessments of research reactors and associated nuclear
facilities worldwide in order to prevent sabotage, theft, or terrorist
attack. GTRI has already gained immense international attention.
Nearly 600 representatives from over ninety countries attended the
GTRI International Partners Conference in September 2004.172
Secretary Abraham and GTRI officials can leverage momentum from
this high-level of interest in GTRI to push even harder to achieve
concrete global cooperative threat reduction.
1. United States Fuel Repatriation
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and the Soviet
Union exported twenty tons of HEU as part of the Atoms for Peace
program for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.' 73 Now the two
powers are devising a strategy to get it back. In the United States, the
171. See Secretary Addresses IAEA, Launches New Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, DOE THIS MONTH, June 2004, at 3-4 (highlighting the need to continue
repatriation efforts of unsecured nuclear and radiological materials despite
available at
months),
eight
last
the
in
progress
significant
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/ 2 62 0 04 102930_DOETM_JUN04
.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
172. See Spencer Abraham, Remarks at the GTRI Partner's Conference Closing
Address (Sept. 20, 2004) (reiterating activities for participants to undertake in the
ensuing months and highlighting upcoming conferences and meetings where
at
available
participate),
can
nations
http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLICID = 16681 &BTCODE=PR_
SPEECHES&TTCODE=PRESSRELEASE (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
173. See U.S. Expert Sketches Nightmare Nuclear Terrorist Attack on Major
City, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2004 (noting that the United States and
Russia developed over 1,000 additional tons of HEU for their weapons programs
which remains unaccounted for).
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Foreign Research Spent Nuclear Fuel ("FRRSNF") Acceptance
Program focuses on recovering U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from
foreign nuclear reactors and repatriating the material back to the
United States. The United States is currently working to recover forty
metric tons of fuel from forty locations throughout the world as part
of the program. Each country poses diplomatic and legal challenges,
but DOE intends to repatriate all of the fuel by 2008 or 2009.17' To

assist this effort, GTRI established a new Global Materials Recovery
Team to pre-position equipment and personnel for nuclear materials
recovery operations. 7 5
2. Russian Fuel Repatriation
Four metric tons of Russian-origin fuel remains spread among
twenty reactors in seventeen countries.17 6 The Russian Research

Reactor Fuel Return ("RRR-FR") Program works to repatriate those
stockpiles back to Russia. 7 7 The DOE intends to repatriate all fresh
HEU fuel of Russian origin back to Russia by the end of 2005, and
all spent fuel by 2010.178 The DOE will conduct repatriation efforts
under new simplified and standardized agreements, with a goal to
convert all twenty reactors to accept LEU fuel if possible. The DOE
signed a framework agreement with Romania under the RRR-FR
program, and it seeks to conclude a similar agreement with all other
179
countries using Russian-origin fuel.

174. See Abraham, supra note 1 (noting that the targeted locations worldwide
comprise high-enriched uranium spent fuel from research reactors).
175. See INITIATIVE HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 170 (indicating that the Global
Materials Recovery Team will help maximize synergies among programs).
176. See Abraham, supra note 1 (noting that the majority of nuclear and
radiological material is concentrated in the former Soviet Union).
177. See New Agreement on HEU Return, NUCLEAR ENG'G INT'L, July 31,
2004, at 4 (stating that the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research And Test
Reactors ("RERTR") program entered an agreement with the RRR-FR to
accomplish the repatriation program).
178. See Claire Applegarth, Russia, U.S. Bolster Regional Nuclear Security
Following Terrorist Attacks, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Oct. 2004) (noting that
twenty sites in seventeen countries posses Russian or Soviet-origin fuel that needs
to be retrieved), at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004-I0/GTRI.asp (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005).
179. See Daniel Homer, U.S. Romania Sign Agreement on Spent Research
Reactor Fuel, NUCLEAR FUELS, Aug. 2, 2004, at 11 (commenting that the
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International nuclear specialists, including U.S. Department of
Energy officials, Russian specialists, and IAEA representatives, have
so far removed Russian HEU fuel from Bulgaria, Libya, Romania,

Serbia, and Uzbekistan, and successfully repatriated it to secure
locations in Russia. 80 Specialists are presently discussing transfers
from the Ukraine and the Czech Republic. 8 ' In one typical operation
on September 9, 2004, nuclear experts removed approximately
eleven kilograms of fresh reactor fuel from Uzbekistan, including
one kilogram of HEU-enough to make one Hiroshima-sized
bomb. 8 2 Removal specialists took the fuel to a Russian facility in
83
Dimitrovgrad for downgrading and placement in secure storage.
Matthew Bunn, a Clinton administration nonproliferation official
now at Harvard University, criticized the airlift out of Tashkent
because it left behind fuel perhaps even more attractive to

agreement provides legal protection to undertake fuel repatriation projects, and
calls for additional measures apart from return of spent fuel, including security and
safety upgrades to nuclear facilities). The author quotes U.S. Department of
Energy spokesman Bryan Wilkes, who classifies the agreement as a "framework"
for joint nonproliferation activities to serve as a model for agreements with other
countries. Id.
180. See, e.g., Peter Baker, U.S.-Russian Team Seizes Uranium at Bulgarian
Plant; Material Was Potent Enough for a Bomb, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at
A 10 (discussing a recent removal procedure from an aging research facility in the
Romania, one among twenty-four reactors targeted by the GTRI program and
Russian officials); see Uzbekistan Uranium Returned to Russia, 24 NUCLEAR
WASTE NEWS 175, 175 (2004) [hereinafter Uranium Returned] (commenting that
the reactor represents one of the largest in Central Asia).
181. See Ann MacLachlan & Daniel Homer, HEU and LEU Research Reactor
Fuel Moved From Uzbekistan to Russia, NUCLEAR FUELS, Sept. 27, 2004, at 13
(citing comments by Alexander Rumyantsev, head of Russia's Federal Atomic
Energy Agency ("FAEA")).
182. See Uranium Returned, supra note 180 (explaining that Soviet-era Russia
supplied the HEU uranium in Uzbekistan to a ten megawatt multipurpose research
reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Academy of Sciences of
Uzbekistan).
183. See MacLachlan & Homer, supra note 181 (commenting that officials
failed to remove spent fuel from the site due to new Russian environmental
regulations that prevent importation of spent fuel).
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terrorists.' 84 While seizure of the stockpile of ninety-percent HEU
fuel serves a useful purpose, failure to remove seventy to eighty
percent HEU fuel leaves open the potentially dangerous possibility
that terrorists could steal this remaining spent fuel to make an
effective atomic bomb.' 85 As an example of another completed GTRI
project, a U.S. Department of Energy delegation recently toured a
two-year program to improve radiological security at the nuclear
18 6
waste repository in Tajikistan.
Before meeting in May 2004, the United States and Russia
repatriated fifteen kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from Libya.'87
Less than a week later, Energy Secretary Abraham signed a
comprehensive agreement in Moscow concerning repatriation of
HEU from other states.'88 Under that agreement, more than a dozen
countries became eligible to receive financial and technical aid to
ship fresh and spent fuel to Russia for safe and secure storage. For its
part, Russia began work with sixteen countries to accept repatriation

184. See id. (citing private officials from the Nuclear Threat Initiative ("NTI")
who consider the remaining spent HEU fuel as a more serious proliferation hazard
than the small amount of HEU fuel actually removed).
185. See id. (referencing Clinton-administration nonproliferation official
Matthew Bunn, who explains that spent HEU fuel stored outside a reactor for at
least five years is "very far from self-protecting" and should be considered a
security threat).

186. See U.S. Team Visits Tajikistan Over "RadiologicalSecurity", INTERFAX
Nov. 19, 2004 (noting that the U.S. Department of Energy has
signed contracts to begin two additional security projects).
187. See DOE Helps Secure Libyan NuclearMaterials,DOE THIS MONTH, Mar.
2004, at 3 (commenting that the combined 55,000 pounds of recovered nuclear
materials and equipment constituted, by weight, the largest recovery up to that
date),
available
at
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/252200416822_DOETMMARO
4.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
188. See U.S., Russia Sign Agreement on Recovery of Russian-Origin HEU
From Research Reactors, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, May 27, 2004 (reporting
that the United States plans to fund the effort while Russia will contribute experts
and equipment to recover material from twenty reactors in seventeen countries for
repatriation
to
Russia),
available
at
http://www.nti.org/d-newswire/issues/2004_5_27.html#4760F637
(last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
NEWS SERVICE,
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of Russian fuel.189 Current plans call for Russia to remove all the fuel

from these targeted reactors by 2013.190 Some have expressed
concern about such a distant target completion date since many HEU
research reactors have little more security than a chain link fence and
a night watchman. 9 ' Moreover, not all countries that have possession

of U.S. or Russian-origin HEU have indicated a willingness to return
it, notably Pakistan and Iran.

192

3. HEU Conversion Program
The third component of GTRI is the Reduced Enrichment in
Research and Test Reactor ("RERTR") program at Argonne National
Laboratory. RERTR was originally established in 1978 in order to
promote technologies and provide assistance in converting HEU
reactors to use LEU fuel. 193 In the intervening years, a number of
factors constrained the program, including budget problems, the
highly technical nature of conversion work, and resistance by some
governments to switch to LEU fuel. The rejuvenated program
integrates technical and diplomatic strategies to overcome this
legacy, and is managed from the Argonnne-West operations in
Idaho. 19
189. See Russian Nuclear Agency Urges IAEA States to Join Nonproliferation
Drive, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Sept. 16, 2004 (adding that the United States
will recover fuel from over one hundred reactors throughout Latin America,
Europe, and Southeast Asia).
190. See Spent Fuel to Be Removed from Tehran Research Reactor, INTERFAX
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 19, 2004.
191. See Matthew Bunn & Anthony Wier, Global Lockdown of Nuclear
Stockpiles is Vital, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Sept. 19,
2004, at A03 (highlighting testimony by the chief of Russia's nuclear agency that
nuclear security was under-funded by millions of dollars), available at
http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,595092080,00.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2005).
192. See, e.g., Wade Boese, Abraham Announces Nuclear Initiative, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY (July 2004), at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_0708/Abraham.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
193. See id. (stating that LEU is safer because it is not suitable for making
weapons).
194. See Daniel Homer, DOE Overhauls RERTR Fuel Development Program,
NUCLEAR FUELS, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1 (citing comments from U.S. Department of
Energy official Andrew Bieniawski that under the lab integration, the RERTR
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Approximately 130 research reactors in dozens of countries
around the world still use weapons-grade HEU. 19 5 Of those, the

United States has slated 105 reactors for conversion. 96 While
researchers have developed alternate LEU that is suitable for others,
considerable technical challenges remain in designing substitute
fuels and progress will take time. The GTRI initiative has already
converted a total of thirty-eight U.S.-designed research reactors,
including twenty-seven of them abroad, from HEU to LEU fuels. 197
The program plans to convert another one-third in the next three to
five years. The final one-third could prove more difficult.198 No

Russian-designed reactors abroad have been converted, although
officials classify seven as capable of conversion.

99

4. NationalNuclear Security Administration
As part of GTRI, the National Nuclear Security Administration

("NNSA") is in charge of streamlining the organization and
enlarging the scope of the current panoply of DOE programs related
to nuclear material removal and radioactive source security 00 By

program will not be responsible both for developing technology to enable
conversions, and actually achieving the conversions).
195. See Uranium Returned, supra note 180 (stating that conversion of reactors
to LEU is a key component to nonproliferation).
196. See Abraham, supra note I (noting that the United States is in the process
of converting one-third of the reactors with another third targeted over the next
three to five years); see also Boese, supra note 192, at 32 (stating U.S. Department
of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham's opinion that work is being completed as
quickly as possible).
197. See Ann MacLachlan, HEU Here to Stay if Fast Reactors Prevail,Russian
Expert Says, NUCLEAR FUELS, Oct. 11, 2004, at 8 (noting that another thirty-one
U.S.-designed reactors do not qualify for conversion, including six in the United
States, fourteen in Russia, and another four abroad, and seven Russian-designed
reactors worldwide).
198. See Boese, supra note 192 (discussing that the complexity of conversions
limits the rate of progress).
199. See MacLachlan, supra note 197 (stating that another twenty-nine U.S.designed reactors qualify for conversion).
200. See INITIATIVE HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 170 (listing programs falling under

the National Nuclear Security Administration ("NNSA") oversight, including the
RRR-FR Program, RERTR Program, Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear
Fuel ("FRRSNF") Acceptance Program, and Radiological Threat Reduction
("RTR") Program).
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Nonproliferation, the Act takes a step in the right direction toward
refining the threat and prioritizing threat reduction responses. The
problem needs to be elevated even higher. The efforts of the NNSA
at the DOE should have a subordinate reporting relationship through
to the National Security Council ("NSC") and a national-level threat
reduction official, as proposed in Part V.B.4.2 °1
The various GTRI programs continue to evolve, and not all forms
2
of assistance necessarily involve specialized skills or equipment.
Sometimes, approaches that are more practical can pay large
dividends immediately. For instance, one national defense specialist
noted anecdotally that DOE officials provided blankets to security
guards at a sensitive site who were leaving their posts unattended
while they foraged for firewood.0 3

IV. THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
And so we find ourselves at the dawn of a new century
in a new arms race. Terrorists are racing to get
weapons of mass destruction. We ought to be racing to
stop them.
-Senator

Sam Nunn

204

Working quietly behind the acrimony surrounding the U.S.-led
war in Iraq, in 2003, the G8 nations achieved a monumental

201. See discussion infra Part V.B.4 (proposing improvements for the NNSA
organization and reporting structure within the NSC).
202. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133, at CRS-14 (highlighting instances of
evolution, such as adjusting to Russian priorities and changing perceptions about
what poses greater risks, and addressing practical considerations).
203. See id. (noting additional practical accommodations, such as installing bars
on windows and blast-proof doors, or providing alternative employment and
income for jobless WMD scientists).
204. Peter Grier, Loose Nukes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 2001, at 11
3
(quoting Senator Sam Nunn), available at http://csmonitor.com/2001/1205/pls 2005).
8,
wogi.html (last visited Apr.
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nonproliferation agreement. 20 5 The goal is to safeguard and dismantle
weapons of mass destruction and related materials in the Former
Soviet Union.20 6 This development should have materialized a
decade earlier, or at the very least, the schedule of work to be done
should have been compressed over the course of a few years.20 7
Instead, it will take at least a decade. 2 8 Nonetheless, the
nonproliferation agreement represents a milestone in cooperative
threat reduction among the major powers. The G8's Global
Partnership framework for nonproliferation has four primary
objectives--destruction of chemical weapons; destruction of nuclear
weapons; nuclear and radiological security; and peaceful
employment of former weapons scientists. While the Partnership will
initially focus on Russia, provisions allow consideration to extend
funding to other countries. 0 9 The milestones for G8 cooperative
threat reduction evolved during G8 meetings in Canada and France,
and culminated at the 2004 meeting in the United States.210

205. See Boutwell, supra note 113, at 5 (discussing G8 countries' proposal in
2002 of the "10+10 over 10" program where the United States would contribute
$10 billion and the remaining G7 countries would match that amount over a tenyear period). This agreement came into existence during the G8 Summit in June,
2002. Id. at n.8.
206. See id. at n.8 (noting the program's aim as "disposing of fissile material,
destroying chemical weapons, dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines,
and securing employment for former weapons scientists").
207. See id. at 5 (arguing that the "10+ 10 over 10" program would better address
the scale and urgency of the problem if the $20 billion were allocated through a
three-year "crash" program).
208. See id. (expressing concern that U.S. domestic political and commercial
factors could delay actual allocation of "10+10 over 10" program funds). The
authors also worry that the European Union decision-making process and
bureaucracy could stymie fund allocation. Jd.
209. See GOv'T OF CAN.: CANADA'S G8 WEBSITE, STATEMENT BY G8 LEADERS:
THE

G8

GLOBAL

PARTNERSHIP

AGAINST

MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE

SPREAD OF

WEAPONS

AND

(highlighting that the Partnership would

consider needs of Former Soviet Union countries who are prepared to adopt the
guidelines), at http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/globpart-en.asp (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
210. See generally GOV'T OF CAN.: CANADA'S G8 WEBSITE, SUMMIT
DOCUMENTS (outlining Summit decisions regarding the G8 Global Partnership
formation and objectives), at http://www.g8.gc.ca/menu-en.asp (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
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A. KANANASKIS, ALBERTA, CANADA-2002

During the G8 Summit held from June 26-27, 2002, in
Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, the G8 countries agreed to spend $20
billion over the next decade to secure and eliminate vast quantities of
fissile material and chemical weapons from Russia and other
countries. 211 In the agreement, which is a scarcely-mentioned U.S.
diplomatic success, the United States pledged to spend $10 billion
2 12
over the next decade on specific nonproliferation programs. Other
G-8 states will match those funds dollar-for-dollar for a $20 billion
combined total.
The amounts pledged range from Germany's goal of spending
21 3 Italy
$1.8 billion to Japan's promise to spend $200 million.
pledged $1.2 billion and the United Kingdom, France, and Canada
214 Russia agreed to spend $2
each pledged about $750 million.
billion 21 5 and the Czech Republic, not a G8 nation, offered to

DEP'T OF STATE, THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE
BY
SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: STATEMENT
G81
THE
BY
STATEMENT
[hereinafter
(2002)
THE GROUP OF EIGHT LEADERS

211.

See U.S.

(enumerating principles to prevent terrorists from acquiring access to weapons or
materials of mass destruction and proposing guidelines for new projects), at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/I1514.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
212. See Andrew Mollison, G-8 Summit at Sea Island, June 8-10: Nunn Urges
Haste in Arms Reduction,

ATLANTA

J. & CONST., May 27, 2004, at A6 (detailing

how much each G8 country pledged to contribute to the Global Partnership
Project).
213. See id. (implying that Tokyo could have afforded to spend more on the
program).
214. See

GOv'T OF CAN.:CANADA'S G8 WEBSITE, G8 CONSOLIDATED REPORT

OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS 1 (2004) [hereinafter G8 CONSOLIDATED
REPORT] (listing detailed funding commitments of all countries involved in the
global partnership), available at http://www.g8.gc.ca/pdf/g8_report.pdf (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005); see also STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP,
DONOR FACTSHEET: CANADA (breaking down Canada's total pledge into the
at
projects),
specific
on
spent
be
to
amounts
http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Canada.html (last visited Apr. 8,

2005).
215. See STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP, DONOR FACTSHEET:
RUSSIAN FEDERATION [hereinafter DONOR FACTSHEET: RUSSIA] (demonstrating
at
partnership),
global
the
to
contributions
planned
Russia's
8,
Apr.
visited
(last
http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor/20Factsheets/Russia.html
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contribute $75,000 to the global partnership.216 Since the United
States would have spent the $10 billion under its threat reduction
programs anyway, the G8 agreement leverages the resources of other
states and effectively doubles the funds committed to securing
dangerous weapons and material.217 The "G8 Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,"
the so-called "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative, was signed by the
leaders of the G8 and announces a set of six nonproliferation
principles.2t 8
First, the states agreed to promote the strengthening and full
implementation of multilateral treaties and other international
instruments directed at preventing the proliferation of WMD.
Second, they agreed to maintain and further develop domestic
measures to account for and secure WMD and related materials, and
to assist other states that lack sufficient resources to account for and
secure them. Third, the G8 pledged to implement robust and
effective physical protection measures at facilities that house WMD,
including defense in depth, and to assist other states that lack
appropriate resources for maintaining physical custody of their
facilities. Fourth, they committed to maintain and tighten border
controls, expand law enforcement efforts, and increase international
cooperation to detect, deter and interdict illicit trafficking. Fifth, the
states agreed to review and strengthen national export and
transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists
and to be particularly wary of dual-use items and the identity of the

2005); see also Russia to Allocate $205m for Global PartnershipProjects in 2004,
ROSBUSINESSCONSULTING, Sept. 19, 2004 (summarizing Russia's commitments to
the global partnership through 2010).

216. See Mollison, supra note 212 (reporting the amounts pledged by the United
States, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Czech Republic).
217. See Lugar, supra note 156 (opining that, through the global partnership,

contributions made to Russia for the safeguarding and dismantling of WMD
doubled without the United States having to increase its commitment further than
the Nunn-Lugar Act calls for).
218. See STATEMENT BY THE G8, supra note 211 (outlining the Global
Partnership Project's goals); see also Gov'T OF CAN.: CANADA'S G8 WEBSITE, G8
MEMBERS (listing the G8 members as Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the European Union), at

http://www.g8.gc.ca/members-en.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
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end-user. 21 9 Finally, the G8 countries will strengthen their efforts to
manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials no longer required
for defense. 2 °
B. EVIAN-LES-BAINS, FRANCE-2003
France chaired the next G8 Summit, which took place in Evianles-Bains, in the French Alps, from June 1-3, 2003.221 The Evian
conference was the springboard for deeper planning, extending the
general principles to a series of policy documents. First, the summit
released a declaration that identified the avenues the G8 would
pursue in nonproliferation, including international treaty inspection
regimes under the IAEA, national and international coordination of
export controls, diplomatic efforts, and, "if necessary other measures
in accordance with international law.

' 222

The declaration also

strongly urged North Korea to comply with its obligations under the
the proliferation
NPT, and warned Iran that the G8 "would not ignore
223
program.
implications of Iran's advanced nuclear

219. See STATEMENT BY THE G8 (specifying that it is necessary to maintain

effective controls over items that are not on the lists but which nevertheless
and
contribute to the development, production, or use of nuclear, chemical,
biological weapons).
220. See id. (resolving to eliminate all chemical weapons and minimize holdings
of biological weapons in addition to disposing of stocks of nuclear weapons).
221. See SOMMET D'EVIAN (Evian G8 Summit Website), CHAIR'S SUMMARY
G8 Summit), at
(outlining the decisions of the 2003
(2003)
http://www.g8.fr./evian/english/navigation/2003_g8-summit/summit-documents/c
hair_s_summary.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
222. See THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF JAPAN, NONPROLIFERATION OF
the
OF MASS DESTRUCTION-A G8 DECLARATION (2003) (reaffirming
WEAPONS

and the
G8's commitment to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention,

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and urging all states that have not
at
treaties),
these
join
to
so
done
Apr.
visited
(last
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2003/dec-3.pdf
8, 2005).
223. See id. (finding that North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium

production programs are a clear breach of its international obligations and
implying that Iran has breached its obligation under the NPT).
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In 2003, Canada committed CDN 1 billion (about $750 million)
over ten years.224 Efforts from Ottawa include a CDN 65 million
contribution toward Russia's Plutonium Disposition Program, which
will help Russia dispose of thirty-four tons of plutonium.225 Canada
also has worked with Russia to fund the dismantlement of Russian
Northern Fleet nuclear submarines. 226 Russian workers are currently
removing fuel from the first of twelve nuclear submarines, a
painstaking $100 million bilateral operation monitored by the
Canadians. Japan has allocated money to dismantle twenty nuclear
submarines, with a target for completing the work by 20 10.227 This is
only a fraction of the money that will be necessary, however, since
Russia intends to dismantle one-hundred more nuclear submarines. 28
In related work, Canada is engaged in the destruction of Russian
chemical stockpiles. 29 At the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons
destruction facility ("CWDF"), Canada's effort is focused on

224. See G8 CONSOLIDATED REPORT, supra note 214, at 1 (detailing the project
areas to which Canada's pledge will apply).
225. See id. (demonstrating that Canada's money will go towards other nuclear
and chemical projects as well as toward employment of former weapons
scientists).
226. See Tom Blackwell, Canadians Dismantle Nuclear Sub: $100 Million
Project: 'It's Symbolic, Really, of the End of the Cold War', NAT'L POST, Oct. 19,
2004, at A4 (noting that paying for the submarine dismantling is but one part of
Canada's larger commitment of approximately $1 billion over ten years to the
global partnership).
227. See Japan to Bankroll Utilization of Russian Nuclear Submarines, RIA
NovoSTI, Apr. 23, 2004 (quoting the Japanese ambassador to Russia as saying that
Japan believes that full utilization of Russian submarines is necessary, especially
considering the threat of terrorism).
228. See Russia Plans to Scrap Another 100 Nuclear Submarines, BBC
MONITORING INT'L REP., Apr. 23, 2004 (reporting how Russia seeks cooperative
agreements with Japan, Canada and Norway to dismantle 100 more submarines
than are funded in existing agreements with France, Britain and the EU).
229. See Gov'T OF CAN.: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, UK AND CANADA COOPERATE TO
ASSIST RUSSIA IN DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS (2003) [hereinafter UK AND

(reporting that the UK will manage Canada's donation on
its behalf to carry out the work in Russia), at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreign-policy/global-partnership/uk canada-en.asp (last visited Apr.
8, 2005).
CANADA COOPERATE]
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230
destroying the most lethal and human portable CW. Prior to the
Global Partnership, Canada had contributed more than CDN 5
231
million to construct the Shchuch'ye facility in the Urals. Under a
Canadian-United Kingdom Memorandum of Understanding signed
in Moscow on November 19, 2003, Canada will spend CDN 33
million to construct an 18km railway connecting the chemical
weapons storage depot near Planovy to the destruction facility at
Shchuch'ye. 32 There are nearly 4 million artillery shells containing
233
nerve agents such as sarin, soman, and V-X stored in the area. The
rail spur is required to safely and securely transport the mass of
approximately 1.9 million chemical munitions located at Shchuch'ye
from storage to destruction, as well as an additional 2 million nerve
agent-filled artillery shells from the nearby Kizner chemical weapons
depot.234
Because Canada and Russia did not have a legal agreement in
place, Canada made its contribution through the United Kingdom's

bilateral agreement with Moscow.

235

The United Kingdom

is

responsible for implementing the Canadian project in consultation
with Ottawa.236

230. See
WEAPONS

GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, SHCHUCH'YE, KURGAN REGION
[hereinafter DESTRUCTION
FACILITY
DESTRUCTION

CHEMICAL
FACILITY]

(describing the Shchuch'ye Facility, its contents, and the history surrounding it), at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/shchuchye.htm (last visited Apr.

8, 2005).
231. See UK AND CANADA

COOPERATE,

supra note 229 (specifying that

Canada's contribution included the construction of an access road to the site and
natural gas and electric power lines to service the facility).
232. See id. (signifying that Canada and the UK have a shared commitment to
ensuring the earliest possible destruction of chemical weapons in Russia).
233. See DESTRUCTION FACILITY, supra note 230 (providing that Kizner and
Shchuch'ye stockpiles contain primarily nerve agent rocket and tube artillery
warheads and projectiles).
234. See id. (clarifying that chemical weapons stored at both the Kizner and
Shchuch'ye depots will be destroyed at the Shchuch'ye facility).
235. See UK AND CANADA COOPERATE, supra note 229 (providing that the
project will be managed under both the Memorandum of Understanding between
the UK and Canada and the UK-Russia bilateral treaty).
236. See id. (naming the contractor in charge of the project as the UK's Bechtel
Ltd.).
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The commitment of the G8 leaders includes an open invitation to
like-minded countries that are prepared to adopt the partnership's
principles and guidelines to enter into discussions on participating in
the initiative. 237 Norway was the first non-G8 country to join the
partnership, and other countries have followed.2 3 s The Netherlands,
Poland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland officially joined the
partnership in 2003.239 That same year, Helsinki committed EUR 8
million to modernize nuclear power plants at Leningrad and Kola,
and EUR 2 million toward dismantling nuclear submarines of the
Northern Fleet.24 °
C. SEA ISLAND, GEORGIA, THE UNITED STATES-2004

At the Sea Island Summit in 2004, seven countries joined the
Global Partnership to increase the total membership to twenty-one
nations, plus the EU.24 ' As a new entrant, Ireland immediately agreed

237. See STATEMENT BY THE G8, supra note 211 (calling on all G8 countries as
well as other states that share in the global partnership's goal of enhancing
international security and safety to adopt six principles to prevent terrorists from
gaining access to weapons of mass destruction).
238. See Press Release, U.N. Information Service, Adapting to World's
Changing Reality, While Not Renegotiating Basic Principles, Greatest Challenge
for Current Session (Oct. 5, 2004) (quoting Kim Taravik of Norway as saying that
the G8 Global Partnership is making the world safer).
239. See Russia Hopes That Other Global PartnershipProgramSignatories will
Translate Promises into Action, RIA NOVOSTI, June 9, 2004 (reporting that a
Moscow diplomatic source believed that some global partnership countries avoid
engaging in new projects, but Norway and Switzerland are exceptions), available
at
http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/2
004/610200424818PM.html#6B (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
240. See Leonid Laakso, Finland to Contribute to Upping Nuclear Safety in
North-Western Russia, RIA NoVOSTI, Aug. 28, 2003 (specifying that Finland's
donation will be a part of an ecological partnership fund intended to provide
support to sixteen nuclear safety and twelve other ecological projects), availableat
http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/2
003/82820033001IPM.html#1D (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). The Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia will allocate EUR 10 million each, and the
EU commission is going to contribute EUR 50 million. Id.
241. See Diplomacy in the Age of Terrorism: What is the State Department's
Strategy?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 108th
Cong. 108-152 (Aug. 19, 2004) (remarks of Ambassador Cofer Black, Coordinator
of Counterterrorism, U.S. Dept. of State) (commenting that the global partnership,
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242
to retrain and employ nuclear weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya.
Other new entrants include Australia, New Zealand, South Korea,
Belgium, Denmark and the Czech Republic.
The Sea Island Summit produced a detailed and public
consolidated report of Global Partnership projects, and the scope is
impressive. 243 For example, the United Kingdom is cooperating with
Russia to build a new spent nuclear fuel storage facility at Murmansk
in 2006.244 The United Kingdom and Australia allocated money for
245 The
dismantling the Russian Pacific Fleet nuclear submarines.
European Commission is funding an array of programs, making a
EUR 1 billion commitment, with most of that amount dedicated to
upgrading nuclear safety at nuclear installations in Russia, the
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. 246 EC projects also include
submarine dismantlement and nuclear security in Northwest Russia,
fissile material disposition and safeguards, employment of former
weapons scientists, and export controls and border management
improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Central
Asia.247

with its new members, are working together to ensure that weapons and materials
of mass destruction are not accessible to terrorists or those who harbor them).
242. See Carl O'Brien, Ireland to Join Fight againstNuclear Traffickers, IRISH
TIMES, June 10, 2004, at 14 (reporting that Irish assistance in the global partnership
will focus on cleaning up of nuclear facilities in Russia and investing in a chemical

weapons destruction program).
243. See generally G8 CONSOLIDATED REPORT, supra note 214 (covering with
detail the contributions of each global partnership member country and the projects
to which each contribution will go).
244. See Russia to Build New Nuclear Waste Storage Facility, INTERFAX NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 16, 2004 (explaining that the £15 million facility will safely store
fuel discharged from Russia's nuclear icebreakers).
245. See G8 CONSOLIDATED REPORT, supra note 214, at 4 (demonstrating the
UK's commitment of at least £10 million per year toward submarine

dismantlement); see also Russia Welcomes Australia's Contribution to Scrapping
Russian Nuclear Submarines, ROSBUSINESSCONSULTING, June 29, 2004 (reporting

Australia's decision to allocate approximately $7 million towards the dismantling
of Russian nuclear submarines).
246. See G8 CONSOLIDATED REPORT, supra note 214, at 1-2 (specifying that the
EC will contribute EUR 334 million towards the nuclear safety of nuclear
installations between 2004 and 2006).
247. Id.
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France is spending EUR 750 million on the disposal of 34 metric
tons of plutonium, submarine dismantlement in Northwest Russia,
and other nuclear, chemical, and biological security and disposition
work.2 48 Germany signed an agreement with Russia in the fall of
2003 to execute its funds toward submarine dismantlement,
enhancement of physical protection systems at fissile material
storage sites, and other WMD-related threat reduction measures. 249
Italy dedicated its EUR 1 billion to nuclear and chemical threat
reduction inside Russia pursuant to an agreement between Moscow
and Rome signed on November 5, 2003.250 Dividing its programs
between DOD and DOE, the United States is spending $10 billion$1 billion per year. 25 ' Fiscal year 2004 programs include the
elimination of strategic offensive delivery vehicles; fissile materials
disposition; Material Protection, Controls, and Accounting; nuclear
weapons storage; security, and transportation;
and HEU
transparency.2 52
The 2005 G8 Summit will be held in Scotland in July. The group
will revisit CTR, focusing especially on controlling bioterrorism and
on methods to control rogue state development of indigenous nuclear
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Russia will assume the
Presidency and host the G8 summit in 2006, and will spend $2
billion on a variety of nuclear and chemical threat reduction
activities. 3 Both the United States and Russia have asserted that
Russia's contribution toward the program should not count toward

248. Id. at 2-3.

249. Id. at 3.
250. Id. at 3-4.
251. Id. at 5-6.
252. See id. at 5-6 (breaking down contribution amounts by agency).
253. See id. at 6 (specifying that Russia's contribution will be divided largely
between submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction); see also
Stephen Dalziel, Analysis: Russia 's Place in the G8, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2002

(opining that although the G8 decided to hold the next summit in Moscow, Russia
is not even close to being one of the world's top 8 developed economies), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2069587.stm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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the $20 billion target in order to encourage other participants to
broaden their support.254
D. UNGA AND UNSC SUPPORT TO THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
Both the U.N. General Assembly ("UNGA") and the Security
Council ratified the work of the G8, which lays the groundwork for
its further expansion.255 In October 2002, the UNGA welcomed and

endorsed the principles of the Global Partnership in Resolution
57/68, "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the New
the
celebrates
Resolution
The
Framework. '25 6
Strategic
great
the
of
expression
as
an
Treaty
implementation of the Moscow
powers' commitment to the NPT and refers to the G8 as an important
player in bolstering international security through the June 2002

initiation of the Global Partnership. 7

254. See DONOR FACTSHEET: RuSSIA, supra note 215 (citing the disagreement
over whether Russia's pledge should count toward the overall goal and the U.S.
and Russian opinions that it should not); see also Major General Nikolay
Bezborodov, Remarks at the Interparliamentary Conference of the European
Commission Nonproliferation & Disarmament Cooperation Initiative (November
20-21, 2003) (declaring that Russia will spend $204 million eliminating chemical
at
available
submarines),
dismantling
and
weapons
2005).
8,
Apr.
visited
(last
http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm
255. See Bilateral Nuclear Strategic Arms Reductions and the New Strategic
Framework, G.A. Res. 68, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 66, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/68 (2002) (recognizing that the global partnership will further the goal
at
available
safety),
and
security
international
achieving
of
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r57.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005); see also
S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004) (affirming that the
proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction constitutes a threat to
at
available
security),
and
safety
international
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscresolutions04.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
256. See Bilateral Nuclear Strategic Arms Reductions and the New Strategic
Framework, supra note 255 (recognizing the Global Partnership program for
enhancing international security and safety by supporting specific cooperation
projects, and calling upon all countries to join the G8 in its nonproliferation
efforts). The United States introduced the resolution and Russia was the cosponsor. Id.
257. See id. (providing that the resolution was passed by consensus in the First
Committee and in the General Assembly).
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The authority of Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28,
2004 strengthens the UNGA's endorsement. 258 Acting under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council declared that all states
shall refrain from providing any support to non-state actors
attempting to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and
related material. 9 Importantly, the Security Council also decided
that all states shall adopt appropriate and effective laws to prevent
non-state actors from acquiring, developing, transporting, or
transferring WMD materials. 260 Because some states may require
assistance in implementing the resolution, the Security Council
invited states in a position to do so to offer assistance, experience
and resources. 261 This Resolution establishes a firm foundation for
dialogue and genuine cooperation for broadening the work of the G8
Partnership and its affiliates, and it provides international legal
authority for developing and implementing the suggestions contained
in Section V of this piece.

258. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 255 (validating the importance of the work
of the global partnership).
259. See id. (listing many initiatives that U.N. member states should adopt in
order to provide an effective response to global threats of nuclear proliferation);
see also Wade Boese, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution on
Denying Terrorists WMD, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (May 2004) (asserting that the
Security Council called on member countries to prevent and punish terrorists who
seek
weapons
of
mass
destruction),
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_05/UN.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
260. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 255 (finding that members states should
also enact laws to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
WMD).
261. See id. (notifying member states that the Security Council will closely
monitor the implementation of the resolution).
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V. ACHIEVING GLOBAL COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION
In theory, there is no difference between theory and
practice.In practice, there is.
-Yogi

Berra

More than a decade of effort under Nunn-Lugar has produced
tangible disarmament results in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Statistics as of late 2004 indicate that 6,472 nuclear warheads have
been separated from their missiles; 559 intercontinental ballistic
missiles ("ICBMs") have been destroyed and 470 ICBM silos have
been eliminated; 13 mobile ICBM launchers and 137 strategic
bombers have been destroyed; 408 Sea-launched ballistic missile
("SLBMs") launchers and 541 SLBMs have been eliminated; 733
nuclear air-to-surface missiles and 27 nuclear-powered strategic
missile submarines have been destroyed, and 194 nuclear test tunnels
and holes have been sealed.262 Table 2, infra, sets forth milestones for
addressing the destruction of excess Russian nuclear systems.

262. See Peter Eisler, Renewal of Deal to Help Secure Russian Arms in Doubt,
USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2004, at 2A (listing some of the weaponry that the United
at
available
Russia),
in
destroy
to
helped
has
States
(last
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200 4 -12-13-inside-nuke-russiax.htm
visited Apr. 8, 2005); see also Press Release, Senator Richard Lugar, Lugar
Introduces New Nunn-Lugar Legislation (Nov. 16, 2004) (documenting the
progress the Nunn-Lugar program has made in deactivating or destroying WMD),
available at http://sgpproject.org/Personal%20Use%200nly/NunnLugar.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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WEAPON

NUMBER DESTROYED

% OF GOAL

Strategic nuclear
warheads

6,472

49%

ICBMs

559

58%

ICBM silos

470

66%

SLBMs

541

75%

SLBM launchers

408

65%

Nuclear-powered
ballistic missile
submarines

27

65%

Strategic bombers

137

86%

TABLE 2: EXCESS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

Most of the work on securing and destroying dangerous materials
in Russia is still in front of us, and other countries have not
completed a thorough accounting. It is difficult to obtain accurate
reports on the amount of nuclear material that remains unaccounted
for or unsecured. Energy Secretary Abraham stated that the United
States has helped eliminate 216 metric tons of HEU, and has secured
43% of unspecified weapons-useable material in Russia.2 63 Russia
has a total of 600 metric tons of nuclear material dispersed
throughout 115 sites. 264 Almost half of the material has received
initial stop-gap security upgrades, but only 26% is stored in
conditions protected by advanced, comprehensive security.265 The
National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE has
accelerated the program to secure Russian nuclear material, and

263. See Applegarth, supra note 178 (reporting that Secretary Abraham believed
that the U.S. and Russia would secure all Russian navy nuclear-warhead sites by
2006).
264. See Eisler, supra note 262 (discussing the U.S. Energy Department's
urging to upgrade security at the Russian sites hold the nuclear weapons material).
265. See id. (noting progress achieved by the United States helping former
Soviet states eliminate weapons of mass destruction for over ten years).
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intends to complete all comprehensive security upgrades for facilities
housing the 600 tons by 2008.266
A. REALIZING BROADER STATE COOPERATION
The great political obstacles to further reducing the proliferation of
nuclear material and the terrorist threat from unsecured nuclear
material eclipses accomplishments so far.267 Other countries'
preparedness to provide adequate cooperation is the underlying issue
controlling future success.268 Diplomacy is the key to that success.

A state's willingness to cooperate in securing civilian and military
nuclear materials may hinge on a cost-benefit calculation.2 69 A
weapons-capable state such as Pakistan has a complex calculation to
make, factoring in present geo-political considerations as well as
nationalism that augurs against cooperation.27° Pakistan must balance
these motivations against the danger of immolation in Islamabad

266. See Full Comm. Hearing on U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction and NonProliferation Programs Before the House Armed Services Comm., 108th Cong.
108-2 (Mar. 4, 2003) (remarks of Acting Under-Secretary of Energy Linton F.
Brooks) (stipulating that the National Nuclear Security Administration believes it
can complete security improvements for nuclear weapons-usable material and
warhead in Russia); see also Abraham, supra note 1 (relating that the DOE's
accelerated efforts to secure the 600 tons by 2008 puts the agency two years ahead
of the schedule inherited from the Clinton administration).
267. See discussion infra part V (describing the success of the Nunn-Lugar CTR
programs).
268. See discussion infra part V.A-B (discussing the problems the United States
and Russia face in the continuing implementation of CTR programs and the steps
necessary to spread CTR around the world).
269. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133, at CRS-2 (asserting that countries
considering partnering with the United States in a Cooperative Threat Reduction
agreement depend on factors such as the country's WMD program's importance to
its security and other geopolitical considerations). Pakistan insists that it is capable
of protecting its own nuclear program and insists on a "hands-off' attitude by the
United States. Id.
270. See id. at CRS 23-24 (noting that Pakistan has a first use policy for nuclear
weapons and has traditionally been reluctant to enter into any kind of agreement
concerning its nuclear weapons, even with close allies like the United States and
the United Kingdom).
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from a terrorist bomb "leaked" out of its own system.2 1 What could
Pakistan's government expect from the United States if a Pakistani
bomb struck an American city? Each state must also grapple with the
psychological and political aspects of cooperation. Critics in Pakistan
and other nations might allege that CTR is just another term for arms
control; that cooperation merely reinforces U.S. power; that it only
rewards and encourages U.S. unilateralism; that cooperation
constitutes succumbing to bribery; or that cooperation is a slight
against national honor and scientific achievement.
One of the greatest hurdles to CTR is effective implementation.
Provisions for one state providing a specific category of support to
another state generally require an implementing agreement setting
forth the terms of cooperation. 72 Sometimes, there is accord in
reaching a strategic agreement, but contention arises over the fine
273
details involved in putting the plan into effect.
The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for the Russian
Federation ("INEPR") of May 2003 sets out an essential framework
for much of the nuclear cleanup in Russia.274 It serves as the basis for
nuclear rehabilitation measures arising from the European Union's
environmental partnership with Russia and the G8 Global
Partnership ("Global Partnership"). 275 However, the parties must

271. See id. (observing Pakistan's past relationships with nations that support
terrorism, such as Iran and Libya and the significant terrorist presence that
country).
272. See discussion infra part V.A (discussing CTR agreements between Russia
and the United States in the post-Soviet era).
273. See id. (examining common points of contention between Russia and CTR
partners, particularly the United States, around issues such as access and liability
limitation).
274. See N. DIMENSION ENVTL. PROJECT, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON A
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAM
IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION (2003) (explaining that activities under this agreement should be
complimentary to other agreements and parties should avoid duplication of
efforts), at http://www.ndep.org/files/uploaded/MNEPRAgreementENGLISH.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
275. See Ann MacLachlan, Final Agreement on Pactfor Nuclear Cleanup in

Russia, NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 19, 2004 (reporting that a year after the initial
signing of the MNEPR, the parties resolved issues such as tax exemption for
countries involved in cleanup work and translation problems).
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come to terms with issues such as liability and taxation that may
overlap institutional and jurisdictional lines of demarcation.276
Reaching any CTR agreement generally involves three difficult
issue areas-access, funding, and liability. Russia has been reluctant
to grant American access to some particularly sensitive sites, even
when the security of those sites is in grave doubt.277 Whereas the
Americans insist on actually visiting locations where United States'
tax dollars are spent, the Russians argue that technical means and
verification are sufficient. 278 Russians contend the United States
simply wants access for intelligence purposes.279
Access problems slowed the installation of "quick fix" and
comprehensive security upgrades at Russian facilities storing 600
tons of nuclear material, for example. 28 0 The Annual Report of the
G8 Senior Officials Group of the Partnership reached an agreement

276. See id. (indicating that the United States refused to sign the liability
protocol of the MNEPR because it prefers more stringent liability protection).
277. See 149 Cong. Rec. S3239 (daily ed. March 6th, 2003) (documenting
Senator Conrad Bums' comment on the uncooperativeness of Russia in refusing to
grant access to sensitive national security sites).
278. See Representatives Curt Weldon and Chet Edwards, The Post-Hussein
Era: America, Russia, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
ARMS
CONTROL
TODAY
(June
2003),
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/weldonedwards.june03.asp (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
279.

NAT'L

ACAD.

OF

SC.,

OVERCOMING

IMPEDIMENTS

TO U.S-RUSSIAN

COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: REPORT OF A JOINT WORKSHOP

26 (2004) (noting that Russian officials perceive American program staff as
making unacceptable requests for confidential material on the "vulnerability and
effectiveness of physical protections systems of specific facilities"), available at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309091772/html/index.html
(last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
280. See Press Release, National Nuclear Security Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Energy, "NNSA Security Upgrades Are Ahead of Schedule, U.S. has Secured
More Nuclear Material in Russia Than Ever Before" (Oct. 2004) (indicating that
the United States accelerated the plan to secure Russian nuclear material by 2008
through efforts to negotiate contracts, eliminate bureaucratic obstacles, and install
new security systems more rapidly), at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/NA-04FS02.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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on access to sites by reducing prior notification delays from forty281
five to thirty days through a procedure of annual lists.

Funding difficulties arise for a variety of reasons. Prior to the
enactment of a Presidential waiver, the United States could not spend
money under the various CTR agreements unless the United States
"certified" that the recipient nation was in compliance with the
stipulations of the obligated funds. 2

One of the most vexing issues concerns legal liability. The United
States insists on protection from legal liability for its agencies and
employees participating in the conversion and clean-up of highly
dangerous materials such as plutonium. 28 3 The original Nunn-Lugar

program of 1992284 relieved the United States of legal responsibility
for possible nuclear damage resulting from nuclear weapons
disposal. 28 5 During the last few years, however, Russia offered what

they regard as a "more progressive formula" of joint responsibility, a

281.

See G8

SENIOR OFFICIALS GROUP,

G8

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE

SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ANNUAL REPORT

(2003) (discussing the various barriers to the implementation of the G8 Global
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,
such
as
tax
exemption
and
liability),
at
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003-g8-summit/summit-documents/gl
obal-partnership.againstjthe.spread of weapons and materials of massdestru
ction - g8 senior officialsgroup-_annual_report.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
282. DAVID SMIGIELSKI, RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NUCLEAR SECURITY ADVISORY
COUNCIL: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2002 CTR CERTIFICATION CRISIS (2003)
(explaining that the original CTR programs required the president to certify that a
country
receiving
CTR
monies
meets
certain
criteria),
at
http://www.ransac.org/Publications/Reports%20and%20Publications/Other%20RA
NSAC%20Papers/624200331947PM.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
283. See Jack M. Beard, A New Legal Regime For Bilateral Assistance
Programs: International Agreements
Governing The
"Nunn-Lugar"
DemilitarizationProgramIn The FormerSoviet Union, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 895, 916
(1995) (explaining the necessity of liability provisions in CTRs because of the
limited liability that the U.S. Department of Defense could assume for CTR
programs overseas and because the U.S. government could not control
implementation activities in foreign countries).
284. See discussion infra part III.A (describing the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991 and subsequent changes and appropriations).
285. See MacLachlan, supra note 275 (explaining that the United States was
seeking more stringent liability protection).
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concept ratified by the Duma.28 6 The resulting impasse delays
effective action.
During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, Senator
Pete Domenici (R-NM) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)
questioned Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton on the liability issue in relation to
the delayed implementation of a U.S.-Russian agreement to dispose
of thirty-four metric tons of plutonium.287 Senator Domenici argued
that if Secretary Bolton could not implement the agreement, then the
President should replace him.288 Secretary Bolton explained that
"[t]he issue that divides Russia and the United States at this point is
whether we're going to get liability protection equivalent to that
which we've operated under for the past twelve years or whether
we're prepared to accept a lesser liability protection.

' 28 9

Senator

Lugar, who suggested that the committee members needed to discuss

286. See U.S. Official, Duma Deputy Discuss Nunn-Lugar Program, INTERFAX
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 29, 2004 (reporting that Konstantin Kosachyov, chairman of

the State Duma International Affairs Committee, acknowledged that in the past,
the Russian government accepted the extensive liability provisions laid out in CTR
agreements with the United States, but in light of agreements such as the MNEPR,
with lesser liability for Russia, the prior provisions were no longer acceptable).
287. See generally Sea Island and Beyond: Status Report on the Global
PartnershipAgainst Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 2-3 (2004) (colloquy between Senators
Pete Domenici and Richard Lugar and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security John Bolton) (discussing the 2004 G8 summit at Sea
Island, Georgia and the progress of the Global Partnership Against Weapons of
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiat
available
Destruction),
Mass
(last visited
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senatehearings&docid=f:96631.wais
Apr. 8, 2005).
288. See id. at 3-4 (testimony and prepared statement of Sen. Pete Domenici)
(accusing Mr. Bolton of being unable or unwilling to resolve the liability issue in
order to allow the CTR agreement with Russia to proceed).
289. See id. at 48 (testimony of Mr. John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security) (assuring the committee that State
Department applied pressure to Russian officials to pass the CTR with extensive
liability protection as failure to do so would endanger past agreements).
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the issue with the President, said, "You've certainly illuminated the
problems ... but not really the solution.5 290
At times, Russia appears recalcitrant. Although Moscow opened
many facilities to inspection, others remain closed.291 Senator Lugar
declared in August of 2004 that increased funding does not ensure
the safeguarding or deactivation of Russia's immense WMD arsenal,
stating that "[D]iplomatic breakthroughs... are almost a prerequisite
to putting major funding increases to work. 2 92 For example, Senator
Lugar noted that more funding could increase ICBM dismantlement
capacity at Surovatikha, but the program would only work if Russia
would commit to delivering more than the four missiles per month
3
they currently turn over for destruction. 29
For its part, Russia claims there is a growing gap between what
partners promised in the Kananaskis summit and resulting G8
action. 294 Disagreement over prioritizing the effort created difficulty

290. See id. at 49-50 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman) (pressing Mr.
Bolton for information on what kind of pressure the G8 and the State Department
planned on applying to Russia to ensure the security of thus far unsecured
plutonium).
291. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Persistent Diplomacy Needed for
Nonproliferation Advances-Senator Lugar lists 12 items to pursue for WMD
security (Aug. 11, 2004) (reporting that Senator Richard Lugar believes that
aggressive diplomacy, not additional funding, is the key to expanding CTRs).
292. See id. (noting that the liability provisions of the CTRs are the major
stumbling block to implementation).
293. See id. (stating that one of Senator Lugar's goals is to bring short-range,
more portable, tactical nuclear weapons under the agreement); see also NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE, RUSSIA: ICBM DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES (2003) (noting
that after the United States and Russia signed an agreement on August 26, 1993 to
eliminate strategic offensive arms, Russia converted the Surovatikha base, a former
Strategic Rocket Forces ("SRF") missile storage and assembly facility, into a
ballistic
missile
elimination
facility),
available
at
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/delivry/icbmdism.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
294. See Russia Hopes That Other Global PartnershipProgramSignatorieswill
Translate Promises into Action, RIA NovoSTI, June 9, 2004 [hereinafter Promises
into Action] (stressing that Russia's priorities are the scrapping of chemical
weapons and the disposal of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines),
available
at
http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear/2ONews/2
004/610200424818PM.html#6B (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
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29 5
in translating political agreements into practical cooperation.
France, for example, seeks to divert Russia into programs that
Moscow does not regard as a priority, and that were not included in
96
the umbrella agreement set forth in the Global Partnership.

The Russians also complain of difficulty in actually receiving
disbursement of pledged money from France and other countries, and
that the money comes with many conditions.29 7 Other states, such as
Norway and Switzerland, better aligned their work with Russian
priorities, which include scrapping chemical weapons and disposing
of decommissioned nuclear submarines.298 Switzerland's contribution
of 17 million Swiss francs for chemical disarmament is fairly
lengthy debates or
modest, but it pledged the money without
29 9
it.
disbursed
promptly
and
preconditions,
B. CREATIVITY AND URGENCY
Complacency and political obstacles hindered past efforts, and the
30 0
scope of those efforts does not match the scale of the threat. Most

295. See id. (noting that Moscow calls for a legal framework for cooperation

with partners).
296. See id. (quoting a Russian diplomat as saying that "[s]ome partners try to
avoid engaging in new projects").
297. See Press Conference with Vladimir Orlov, PIR Center Director, and
Laura S.H. Holgate, Nuclear Treat Initiative Fund Vice President, on
Nonproliferation Issues (Part 1), FED. NEWS SERV. (RUSSIA), Apr. 21, 2004

[hereinafter Press Conference Part 1] (highlighting that Japan, on the other hand,
pledged $200 million and actually disbursed several million).
298. See Promises into Action, supra note 294 (indicating that Russia's
priorities, namely chemical weapons and destroying nuclear submarines, differ
from those of other partners).
299. See Press Conference with Vladimir Orlov, PRI Center Director, and
Laura S.H. Holgate, Nuclear Threat Initiative Fund Vice President, on
Nonproliferation Issues (Part2-Final), FED. NEWS SERV. (RUSSIA), Apr. 21, 2004

[hereinafter Press Conference Part 2] (indicating that it is possible that the
program could be disrupted because of a lack of funds received from countries
holding back funds due to legal issues).
300. See discussion infra part V.A (discussing the success and failure of the
original CTR agreements with Russia).
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of the work lies in the future.3 °1 It is impossible to overstate the
urgency of the required tasks. The danger is palpable, spilling over
into the political arena. In the United States, some critics charge the
Bush administration with irresponsibility, 30 2 while others defend the
administration's record.30 3 Regardless of assessments about the past,
there is a clear conviction that the United States should accelerate
efforts to globalize CTR. 3° Diplomacy is needed to bring others on
board.
The lack of progress exasperates Graham Allison, perhaps the
leading American authority on proliferation:
If the material for the terrorist bomb that blows up in Paris or Moscow or
New York in 2005 is scheduled to be secured in 2008, voters will look
back at the elegant language of multiple G-8 summit meetings and
wonder why it was so hard to translate those words into action.30 5

301. See Nunn, Lugar: Program to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Weapons and
Materials Must be Accelerated, Reshaped to meet Terrorist Threat, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12, 2003 (asserting that current efforts to reduce nuclear threats
are too slow to effectively keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists).
302. See Joshua Glenn, Slouching to Armageddon, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
16, 2003, at D2 (reporting that Steven Weinberg, a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations' independent task force on Homeland Security, ridiculed the
administration's missile defense program, calling a missile strike the "least likely
way" that terrorists might attack the United States). Mr. Weinberg advocates for
the reinvestment of the money in the under-capitalized Nunn-Lugar programs. Id.
See also PERKOVICH, supra note 118 (giving a mildly critical assessment of the
Bush Administration's approach).
303. See Lugar, supra note 156 (asserting that "[t]he Bush administration's
record on securing weapons of mass destruction has been one of innovation and
activism. Its record on securing dangerous weapons and materials is a rare case in
U.S. politics where the performance of a candidate far exceeds his rhetoric on the
issue").
304. See Cent. for Def. Info., Nunn, Lugar: Programs to Secure Vulnerable
Nuclear Weapons and MaterialsMust be Accelerated, Reshaped to Meet Terrorist
Threat, Russia Weekly, Mar. 12, 2003 (claiming that the scope of current CTR
effort "does not match the scale of the threat at a time when these programs are
more essential than ever"), available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/248-14.cfmn (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
305. Graham Allison, The Eight Spoke Loudly, and Did Little to Loose Nukes,
INT'L
HERALD
TRIB.,
June
12,
2004,
at
6,
available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/allisonloosenukes iht 061204.ht
m (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). Allison also argued that at its current rate of
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What can be done? There are a number of proposals that the
Global Partnership could sponsor to speed action. Table three is a
proposed plan of action that prioritizes the urgency of global threats
to proliferation. The table identifies the areas of most urgencyproviding a schematic on prioritized targets-those threats in greatest
need of global attention and invigorated multilateral engagement.

TABLE

3: PRIORITIZING NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION ASSISTANCE

Although there is grave danger, there is plenty of reason to avoid
despondency and encourage optimism about the future. In the 1960s,
twenty-one countries either had nuclear weapons or considered
pursuing nuclear programs.3 0 6 In the 1980s, there were sixteen such
movement, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction will not secure loose nuclear weapons and materials in Russia until
2017. Id.
306. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 11 (noting that Argentina, Australia,

Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, South
Africa, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United
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states; by 2004, there were only ten, including Iran and North
Korea.307
1. Additional Resources

In their report, the 9/11 Commission clearly stated that the global
terrorist threat requires a multi-faceted and global response,
including strong global CRT.3 °8 It is a critical priority to urge
members of the Global Partnership to meet their financial pledges for
actual nonproliferation projects.30 9 Even if the members meet these
goals, these nations must spend even more money. Although the $20
billion pledged by Global Partnership members is a step in the right
direction, that amount is paltry in comparison to the problem. 310 It

amounts to $2 billion per year from countries that produce 70% of
the world's gross domestic product. 1 At that rate, the international
community will not secure Russia's nuclear inventory until 2017.
The Global Partnership must address Russian concerns about
disbursement of funds from particular states. Some Russian experts

Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia all either had weapons or considered
weapons programs in the 1960s).
307. See id. (indicating that in the 1980s, the states with nuclear capability or
pursuing nuclear capability were Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Iran, India, Iraq,
Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, the
United Kingdom and the United States). In 2004, the nuclear states and those
aspiring to nuclear status are China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and North Korea are suspected of
pursuing nuclear weapons. Id.
308. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE

FINAL 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 381 (2004) (expressing the concern of experts
that the U.S. government is not fully committed to securing nuclear weapons
throughout
the
former
Soviet
republics),
available
at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/05aug20041050/www.gpoaccess.gov/9 11
/pdf/fullreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
309. See Press Conference Part 1, supra note 297 (quoting Russian official
Vladimir Orlov as saying that the first priority of the Global Partnership is
receiving the assets, "[b]ecause there is a difference between declared money and
money received, between what has been pledged or committed and what has been
received").
310. See Allison, supra note 305 (asserting that although the members of the G8
Global Partnership pledged $20 billion, it spent less than halfa billion).
311. See id. (comparing the promised $20 billion from the Global Partnership to
the $100 billion spent by the United States in Iraq during 2003-2004).
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view the disbursement problem, and the ensuing bureaucratic
difficulties, as an incentive to edge out foreign cooperation."' This
would be disastrous to American and other nations' interests,
slowing the process of accounting for and protecting materials and
weapons in Russia, and eroding contributing states' ability to
monitor Moscow's progress in threat reduction.313 This is especially
important since some constituencies in Russia may want to divert
funds for dismantling and securing weapons and materials into
314 Delaying
programs to reconstitute and revive those capabilities.
allocation and disbursement is penny wise and pound foolish. Instead
of focusing on concerns about the proper obligation of the funds
from the 10 + 10 over 10 formula, the Global Partnership should
is
focus on expanding the program.3" 5 The 10 + 10 over 10
31 6
years.
many
too
over
money
little
too
insufficient, amounting to
One of the best studies suggests that it will take $30 billion just to
secure the nuclear legacy of Russia, and that there are other
stockpiles of WMD and related materials, including weapons-grade
31 7
plutonium and HEU, inadequately secured around the world.
312. See Press Conference Part 1, supra note 297 (asserting that Russia's
dependence on foreign aid should end through a gradual increase in Russian
financing of nonproliferation programs).
313. See Fred Weir, Russian Critic Says Millions from Canada for Nuclear
Cleanup Going Astray, CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 25, 2003 (asserting that the
members of the Global Partnership must keep a close eye on how Russia spends
available at
activities),
nonproliferation
for
allocated
funds
the
2 0 0 3 9 2 2 2 34 2 34 5 3 (last visited Apr. 18,
0 5
http://www.vivelecanada.ca/article.php/
2005). But see Press Conference Part 1, supra note 297 (contending that Russia
should handle its own responsibilities in the war on terrorism and that more
business contracts should go to Russian companies, as nearly 90% now go to
companies outside of Russia).
314. See Weir, supra note 313 (reporting that a former Soviet nuclear submarine
captain alleges that Russia funnels Global Partnership funds into its Atomic Power
Ministry to revive nuclear weapons production and build power stations).
315. See discussion infra part IV.A (describing the funding match program
between the United States and other member states of the G8).
316. See Allison, supra note 305 (asserting that the money given so far by the
Global Partnership will not secure Russia's loose nuclear material until 2017).
317. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at iv & Appendix A- 1 (advocating that the
return in national security of such an investment would be the highest on any
current U.S. national security and defense program); see also Madeline Albright &
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Another expert puts the figure at $40 billion for Russia alone. 31 8
Although there are three pillars to effective control of nuclear
proliferation (counter-proliferation, consequence management, and
nonproliferation), thus far counter-proliferation and consequence
management received by far the greatest share of expenditures.3 19
One prominent nonproliferation expert suggests that the United
States should triple spending on nonproliferation.32 °
Competing priorities always impose an inescapable, "zero-sum"
logic on the allocation of scarce defense resources. Choices must be
made. Intelligence suggests the most likely avenue for a nuclear
attack against the United States is a terrorist bomb smuggled into an
American city.3 2' A November 2004 report by the Defense Science
Board concluded that addressing the nuclear terrorist threat "requires
attention that is at least as serious as that devoted to missile
defense. 322 The United States devoted $35 billion toward missile

Robin Cook, We Need a Global Attack on Nuclear Proliferation(Editorial), L.A.
TIMES, June 7, 2004, at B9 (arguing that not enough action follows the assertions
by international leaders on the importance of nuclear nonproliferation).
318. See Press Conference Part 2, supra note 299 (stating that nonproliferation
efforts in Russia require additional funds beyond the $20 billion thus far promised
by the Global Partnership).
319. See, e.g., Joseph Cirincione, President Bush Moves to Stop Spread of
Nuclear Weapons, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 17, 2004, at 6 (showing that including the
war in Iraq and missile defense, counter-proliferation accounted for $81 billion in
2004; homeland defense accounted for $41 billion and nonproliferation merely $2
billion). Although it is debatable whether to include the Iraqi war in the "counterproliferation" column, it is still clear that there is an imbalance in funding to the
detriment of nonproliferation efforts. Id.
320. See id. (noting that "for the price of three weeks of operations in Iraq, [the
U.S.] could make tremendous progress on removing exactly the weapons and
materials lying in often poorly-guarded facilities that terrorists are most likely to
seek").
321. See OFF. OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH. &
LOGISTICS, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
PREVENTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK 1 (2004)
(asserting that such an attack would not only kill a great many people, but also

impact the United States politically, economically, and culturally), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-06-ClandestineNuclearAttack.pdf (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
322. See id. (stating that the risk of clandestine nuclear attack is such a
dangerous aspect of the war against terrorism that it warrants this treatment).
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defense over the last four years.12 1 This spending eclipsed
3 24
Department of Defense and Department of Energy CTR spending.
The Defense Science Board reported that "nuclear weapons are
oozing out of control. 3 2 Analysts concluded that a clandestine
terrorist attack is more likely than a missile strike because such
methods are "less costly, easier to acquire and more reliable and
accurate. 32 6 In addition to shifting costs onto an even wider group of
participants, the United States should rebalance budgets to better
reflect potential threats.327
2. Rethinking Deterrence
Michael Ignatieff has written that "[e]vil has escaped the prison
house of deterrence devised by the Westphalian order. 3 28 States
today face the possibility of a nuclear attack occurring within a
severely degraded deterrence structure. While deterrence will still
play a potentially important role in preventing nuclear terrorism,
fallout analysis will become a growing area for action.329

323. See generally Wade Boese, Panel: Secret Nuclear Attacks Possible, ARMS

(Nov. 2004) (asserting that nonproliferation efforts are as
at
defense),
missile
as
important
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_ 1/NuclearAttacks.asp (last visited Apr.
CONTROL TODAY

18, 2005).
324. See Cirincione, supra note 319 (asserting that the monies allocated to
missile defense and counter proliferation eclipse nonproliferation budgets).
325. Id.
326. Boese, supra note 323 (noting that some missile defense critics use this
conclusion to condemn the Bush administration's long-range missile defense
system).
327. See Cirincione, supra note 319 (noting that although the President talked
about the importance of nonproliferation, no additional funding followed).
328. Anthony Lewis, Bush and the Lesser Evil, 51 N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS 9

(2004) (reviewing

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICS ETHICS IN AN

AGE OF TERROR (2004)), availableat http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17111 (last

visited Apr. 8, 2005).
329. See William J. Broad, Addressing the Unthinkable: U.S. Revives Study of
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at Al (discussing the' U.S. government's

recent revival of the scientific art of fallout analysis, which was lost after the Cold
War), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0319-04.htm
visited Apr. 18, 2005).

(last
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Much of the radiochemistry work had to be resurrected from the
Cold War by calling in retired scientists and dusting off decades old
analysis. The program now involves manned aircraft and ground
robots that can enter areas of fallout in order to take critical measures
of fallout signature.33 °
The goal of fallout analysis is to quickly discover the source of
nuclear material used to make an atomic bomb.3 3 ' The United States
restarted the Cold War-era fallout analysis program in 1999 hoping
that if weapons experts could trace bombs back to terrorists and their
state sponsors, terrorists would be less likely to use them.332
Although this assumption may be invalid, accurately identifying the
source reactor of the HEU certainly complicates proliferation
thinking in places like North Korea and Iran.333
The United States should explore opportunities for sharing and
exchanging dust samples and forensic techniques with other
countries participating in the G8 program.334 While one Princeton
physicist worries that current levels of cooperation are lagging,
expanding cooperation is eminently sensible because it would
enhance deterrence by publicizing and promoting U.S. science.335
Cooperation could also lead to a more assertive effort to gain
cooperation from nuclear states in tagging and registering their fissile

330. See NATION

SAFER,

supra note

110 (detailing the role of robotic

technologies in all phases of counterterrorism, including detection, prevention, and
protection). Robots' high mobility, sensitivity, and precision make them superior

to humans and ideal tools in counterterrorism missions. Id.
331. See Broad, supra note 329 (describing the government's secretive effort
whose plans are only recently becoming public).
332. See id. (outlining the goal of the revived fallout analysis program and
stating that discovering where nuclear material came from would "clarify the
options for striking back").
333. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133 at CRS-7-10 (discussing the unique issues
North Korea and Iran present and the need for the United States to tailor its
assistance to each differently).
334. See Broad, supra note 329 (suggesting that experts could identify a bomb's
origin by matching debris signatures with collections of classified data about
nuclear arms around the world).
335. See id. (noting physicist William Happer's concern that the program may
not be cooperating enough with nuclear allies and belief that it is to everyone's
advantage to share).
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material. 336 Explosions reveal tags, which are unique physical
337
If
parameters of each fissionable piece of a nuclear weapon.
terrorists used the nuclear material in a nuclear attack, experts could
determine the reactor or laboratory of origin, exposing the mediating
state to responsibility. The prospect of being held accountable for
providing material to nuclear terrorists provides incentive for
countries to participate in a comprehensive tagging program and
leads to greater deterrence.338
3. Rethinking Incentives
While we must approach deterrence with a fresh perspective, we
also need to rethink incentives that reward good behavior. Some
have made the argument that the war in Iraq provides a compelling
warning for states pursuing nuclear weapons programs. 339 Although
the war has certainly heightened awareness of the danger of WMD
proliferation, critics counter that preemptive war might only spur a
state to accelerate their nuclear weapons research in order to develop
a deterrent to American power.34 ° Libya may provide the foremost

336. See Anders Corr, Nuclear Terror and the Blind-Side Attack: Deterrence
through Nuclear Tagging, 7-8 (Mar. 16, 2004) (unpublished draft paper)
(recognizing that each state has an incentive to tag and register its fissile material
so as to avoid suspicion from other states in the case of a blind-side attack),
at
available
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-corr/NuclearTerrorAndTheBlindSideAttackD
eterrenceThroughNuclearTagging.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
337. See id. at 2 (analogizing tagging to stamping each manufactured bullet with
an irremovable serial number and maintaining ammunition registration
documents).
338. See id. (acknowledging that the United States and the international
community would need to take action against states that failed to take proper
precautions and allowed terrorists to steal and explode fissile materials).
339. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 11 (noting that while Iraq no longer has
weapons of mass destruction, the United States' use of force has demonstrated the
dangers of proliferation).
340. See id. at 10-18 (finding that the majority of countries feel that the five
original nuclear-weapon states-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States--do not intend to fulfill their own commitments to eliminate
nuclear weapons). With regional conflicts building, these countries must use their
diplomatic powers to defuse tensions that may trigger potential use of nuclear
weapons. Id.

AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

[20:703

example of how states pursuing nuclear weapons can be redeemed.34'
It is not certain what brought Tripoli to forgo developing its WMD
programs-perhaps both the "carrot" and the "stick" were
influential.342 Other states are watching, however, and it is important
that we promote the voluntary abandonment of nuclear programs
343
since it is easily the most preferred model.
Whether an example was made in Iraq we may never know, but it
is absolutely essential to make an example in Libya. To the extent
that Libya is making a full and complete accounting of their
programs, as it appears they are, the G8 should handsomely and
publicly reward Tripoli. Incentives can help states conclude that they
are better off without nuclear weapons. By providing positive
benefits of cooperation, states should design incentives to tilt the
decision calculus against weapons. 3 " Inducements could take the
form of economic, political, and security contributions, assistance in
developing alternate forms of energy besides nuclear energy, and
even formal and informal security guarantees.345
While security guarantees appear troubling for many, this
inducement was essentially the bargain struck during the Helsinki

341. See SQUASSONI, supra note 133, at CRS-39 (discussing Libya's decision to
give up support of international terrorism and proliferation in exchange for lifting
economic sanctions).
342. See id. at CRS-26 (noting that many observers believe that Libya chose to
eliminate its WMD program because it would help lift U.S. sanctions). Others
believe that Libya gave it up because it was no longer a successful program. Id.
343. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 31 (suggesting that the United States
encourage voluntary measures against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons). States and non-state actors have placed greater emphasis on
voluntary codes of conduct to alleviate serious problems caused by socially
harmful state or private actions. Id.
344. See Paula B. McCarron & Cynthia A. Holt, A Faustain Bargain?Nuclear
Weapons, Negative Security Assurances, and Belligerent Reprisal,25 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 203, 216 (2001) (discussing the formation of the NPT, which
provided incentives to non-nuclear weapon states in exchange for their legal right
to develop or acquire nuclear weapons).

345. See, e.g., id. at 215 (noting that the non-nuclear powers agreed to never
acquire nuclear weapons with the promise that nuclear weapon states would assist
them if they were attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons).
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process.3 46 At the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension,

Western Europe, Canada, and the United States agreed not to use
force to change the borders in Central Europe in exchange for a
broad and deep agreement on political development and human
rights.3 47 The Copenhagen Document was a comprehensive and

extremely detailed manifesto for liberal society, electoral democracy,
348
government by the rule of law, and advancement of human rights.
The Western powers exchanged a promise not to invade Eastern
Europe-something they were already bound by international law
not to do-for the promise of specific and detailed political changes

behind the Iron Curtain that ushered in a peaceful political and social
revolution in the communist bloc.34 9 Copenhagen was nothing short
of profound, becoming the most dramatic and far-reaching document
on human rights and democracy and explicitly setting forth essential
rights and freedoms for the first time.35 °

346. See Thomas Buergenthal, Copenhagen: A Democratic Manifesto, 153
WORLD AFF. 5, 5 (1990) (discussing the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on
Security Cooperation in Europe, which provided the ground rules for maintaining
peace and ideological competitiveness in Europe).
347. See id. (stating how Western governments agreed not to upset de facto or
de jure international borders in Eastern Europe-something they were already
obligated to observe under international law-in exchange for political
liberalization behind the Iron Curtain).
348. See Gregory Flynn & Henry Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic
Peace: The CSCE, Norms and the Construction of Security in Post-Cold War

Europe, 53

INT'L ORG.

505, 515-16 (1999).

349. See id. at 516 (highlighting the international community's duty to resolve
disputes in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law and before an
independent judiciary).
350. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990,
29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307-09 (noting that these principles were, generally: free
elections scheduled at reasonable intervals by secret ballot; genuinely
representative government; the duty of the government and public authorities to
comply with the constitution; the guarantee of human rights and fundamental
freedoms by law and in accordance with international law; legislation adopted at
the end of a public procedure and published regulations; accountability of military
authorities civil authorities; effective means of redress against the administrative
action of the state; an independent judiciary and independent legal practitioners;
and extensive and neutrally-applied criminal procedures).
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According to Thomas Buergenthal, a public member of the U.S.
delegation to the Copenhagen Conference, the Copenhagen
Document proclaimed a new public order based on democratic
pluralism that was as important in its way as the Peace of
Westphalia. 35 The resultant liberalization of regimes throughout
Eastern Europe, encouraged in no small part by Copenhagen,
produced genuine and irreversible strategic security for the United
States, Canada, and Western Europe that was far more durable than
what would have been achieved through threats.352 In like manner,
properly-constructed security guarantees for even the most obstinate
adversaries can produce genuine security, with the primary security
benefits going to the United States, the G8, and its friends and
allies.35 3
Commenting on European and American strategies for dealing
with the Iranian nuclear ambitions, Robert Einhorn of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies has suggested that up until now
the Americans have played the "bad cops" and Europeans have
played the "good cops. '354 "What's needed now is for the United
States and the Europeans to switch roles."35' 5
4. IncreasingHigh-Level Engagement
Sometimes, the process of diplomacy works slowly, and in those
cases, the United States and others should be patient. After all, it
took eight months to craft U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, but

351. See Buergenthal, supra note 346, at 5-8 (arguing that this document
allowed Europe to declare its belief that only societies that believe in democratic
pluralism and a commitment to the rule of law can fully respect and preserve
human rights).
352. See id. at 7 (noting that the United States, Canada, and Western Europe can
invoke the Copenhagen document's democratic values to justify withholding

economic assistance to non-complying states in order to bring about political
change).
353. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 13 (citing the need for sustained
cooperation from diverse nations to broaden and enforce nonproliferation rules to
sustain security).
354. See Chang, supra note 103 (noting that European countries decided not to
take Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council, while the United States is pursuing
such action).
355. Id.
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the Security Council unanimously adopted it.356 Eight months is a
positively breakneck pace when considering how long it takes to
actually implement some cooperative threat reduction programs.
In the mid-1990s, U.S. and Russian experts agreed that storage
sites containing Russian nuclear warheads were in drastic and
immediate need of extensive security improvements.357 The facilities
lacked personnel stability and even basic security.358 Some research
reactors only have a night watchman and a chain-link fence
providing security.3 59 Russian and American officials agreed on a

two-phased plan beginning with a "quick fix" layered security and
a more
fence system with intrusion detectors and followed 3by
60
facility.
each
to
tailored
comprehensive security umbrella
The force that guards Russia's nuclear weapons, the 12th Main
Directorate of Russia's Ministry of Defense, initially ordered fifty
pre-fabricated sets of the one square kilometer fencing, which arrived
in the first quarter of 1998, just as the ruble was crashing.3 61 The 12th
Main Directorate then ordered seventy-three more, which were

356. See Bolton Outlines, supra note 81 (demonstrating the clear international
recognition that active cooperation among countries is useful and essential).
357. See, e.g., Michael Jasinski, Russia: Nuclear Weapon Security and Safety
Issue, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Apr. 2001 (recognizing that while there have
not been any incidents or accidents involving nuclear weapons, such an event is
at
available
future),
the
in
possible
(last visited
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/security/secovr.htm
Apr. 8, 2005).
358. See, e.g., id. (observing that nuclear weapons maintenance personnel
reportedly lacked the special footwear required for working with nuclear
munitions). There have also been reports of deteriorating conditions causing
significant personnel outflow and endangering training programs. Id.
359. See Bunn & Wier, supra note 191 (stating that while this lack of security is
a global problem, each country can help prevent nuclear terrorism by locking down
its stockpiles and keeping them out of terrorists' hands).
360. See BUNN & WIER, supra note 120, at 52 (noting that the first stage would
provide enough time for more time-consuming security upgrades).
361. See id. at 52 (noting that the U.S. Department of Defense purchased and
delivered the fencing units).
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delivered in the third quarter of 2000.362 The 12th Main Directorate
lacked the funds to install the systems, so it approached the United
States about funding the installation.363 The United States agreed, but
U.S. officials insisted on monitoring the work to ensure that the
installations were actually completed and that the quality of work
was within standards. 36
The Russians balked at providing access to their sensitive nuclear
storage sites, and the haggling continued until 2001, when the 12th
Main Directorate permitted the Americans access to a single site.3 65
In early 2002, the Russian Ministry of Defense obtained permission
from the Prime Minister to permit the Americans broad access to
monitor the installations, but there was a delay of about a year as the
Bush Administration temporarily declined to certify Russia's
compliance with statutory requirements for threat reduction
assistance.366 In the summer of 2003, U.S. experts visited nine sites
in preparation for installation of the quick fix upgrades as well as the
more comprehensive upgrades. 367 By the summer of 2004, officials
had only installed about half of the equipment delivered. 368
Other problems have emerged. The DOD Inspector General has
cited several projects as wasteful, including a project that cost the

362. See id. (resulting in a total of 123 fences, which correspond to
approximately 123 warhead storage bunkers under the 12th Main Directorate's
control).
363. See id. at 52-53 (acknowledging that originally, the 12th Main Directorate
would install these fences themselves to avoid any need for U.S. experts to visit
these secret sites).
364. See id. at 52 (recognizing that under U.S. procurement laws, U.S. officials
had to actually visit the sites and ensure that Russians properly installed the fences
if U.S. taxpayers were paying for the project).
365. See id. at 52-53 (noting that this "pilot project" was not the only instance
when Russia permitted foreigners to visit these secret storage facilities). For
example, Russia had allowed Gen. Eugene Habiger to visit a warhead storage
facility in 1997 as the then-commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Id.
366. See id. at 53 (recalling that officials signed modified agreements in early
2003).
367. See id. (finding that Russia's reliance on U.S. funding has brought Russia's
own installation efforts to a virtual standstill).
368. See id. (arguing that the "quick fix has been anything but quick" since
roughly half of the equipment remains in warehouses).
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United States $100 million to build a Russian processing facility to

3 6 9 After it was built, Russia
destroy fuel from nuclear missiles.
diverted the fuel for use in commercial rockets, leaving the plant
idle. 37 In yet another case, the United States funded a $400 million
37
high-security nuclear materials storage facility in Russia. ' The two
countries, however, now face disagreement over what materials the
facility will hold, and whether the United States will be able to verify
37
that it does not store fuel for nuclear weapons.
It is vital to the national interest of all of the G8 and its affiliates to
373
speed up the clock on cooperative threat reduction. One appealing
mechanism to help accomplish this is institutional reform. Former
Senator Sam Nunn and others have recommended creation of a fulltime senior U.S. official who would answer directly to the President
and lead the myriad efforts among the different agencies that are
working nonproliferation.3 74 All of the G8 countries should consider
designating a high-level global CTR official with access to the
President or Prime Minister who can cut through red tape and make
CTR a top national security priority.
Contrary to the critics' argument that the creation of a new
Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") merely creates a new layer
of bureaucracy, a single official in charge of nonproliferation could
add real value. Such an official would have a marginal impact inside
the United States, but may be able to effectively leverage the

369. See Eisler, supra note 262 (recognizing that this dispute is one of several
slowing U.S. efforts to help Russia protect and destroy nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons).
370. See id. (describing Russia's wasteful application of U.S.-funded projects).
371. See id. (noting that Russia has yet to use this particular facility).
372. See id. (stating that the Pentagon wants to create a binding agreement with

Russia regarding U.S. assistance).

373. See Sam Nunn & Michele Flournoy, G-8's Unfinished Business: Handling
Global Terrorism, THE RECORD (Bergen Co., New Jersey), June 15, 2004
(recognizing the concerted efforts of terrorists groups to acquire nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons as an immediate threat).

374. See id. (proposing that this official should have the power to quickly

eliminate all obstacles to cooperation); see also Bunn & Wier, supra note 191

(arguing that this official must make this issue a priority and keep the White House

informed on a daily basis).
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influence of the President during negotiations over access and

cooperation. This is because the principle obstacle now for effective

CTR is a lack of cooperation in working out program details.375 In
the United States, a senior official should be able to gain the
attention of the Vice President and President to intervene regularly in
international bureaucratic squabbles in order to negotiate
breakthroughs with their counterparts. Although the White House

already has a legion of myriad concerns and scarcely room for one

more, there is little else that is more pressing to U.S. national
security.
There is a tendency to fail to appreciate the dispositive role that
one individual can have in international relations. Most political
scientists contend that individuals often matter very little in shaping
international politics and argue that impersonal domestic or global
political forces,376 or systemic37 7 or cultural forces,37 cause
international events and largely erase the impact that one person can
have in world politics.379 In fact, individuals are an important
component of a state's diplomatic influence.38 0 A senior official in
375. See, e.g., Bolton Outlines, supra note 81 (citing the Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as reliant on the
commitments of sovereign states, acting together and independently to eliminate
and secure sensitive materials).
376. See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., Alfred A. Knopf
6th ed. 1985) (1948) (citing a number of factors that influence national power, such
as resources, industrial capacity, and technology, which subsequently influence
the
balance of power internationally).
377. See generally GEORGE MODELSKI, LONG CYCLES IN WORLD POLITICS
(1987) (linking waves of major innovations to the start of wars and the rise of great
world powers); WORLD SYSTEM HISTORY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LONG-TERM
CHANGE (Robert Allen Denemark et al. eds., 2000) (providing a unified
study of
world system history as a vital tool in understanding contemporary issues).
378. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND
THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (arguing that the primary source
of
conflict in the new world will not be ideological or economic, but cultural).

379. See generally

KENNETH

N.

WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR

(1959)

(outlining three images or levels of analysis-the individual, state, and
international system-but rejecting the individual level in favor of the systemic or
global image).
380. See Daniel L. Byman & Kenneth M. Pollack, Let Us Now Praise Great
Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In, 25(4) INT'L SECURITY 107, 134-36 (2001)
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each nation, working solely on cooperative threat reduction, could
have a dispositive influence on G8 efforts to obtain greater
cooperative threat reduction among friends and allies, and even
among rivals. As Henry Kissinger remarked after his first Middle
East shuttle in 1974, "As a professor, I tended to think of history as
run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see
the difference personalities make.""38
5. Expanding Cooperation
The final recommendation is an expansion of the G8's focus to
include problems outside of Russia, and an integration and support of
disparate nonproliferation programs outside of Europe. Cooperative
threat reduction should include nations "beyond the problem cases"
in order to "widen the international understanding of the benefits" of
cooperation.3 82 There are dozens of potentially eligible nations
around the world. A model of such cooperation is the program
between the Kazakh Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty and the
International Science and Technology Centre, a nonproliferation
organization established by the European Community, the United
383 These two
States, Japan, and Russia, located in Moscow.
institutions recently embarked on a ten-year program to strengthen
control over nuclear materials in order to make them inaccessible to
terrorists.384
In some states, perhaps even North Korea or Iran, it is possible
that no level of pressure will prove successful in addressing
proliferation. After the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a
(arguing that personality differences may lead to variance in individuals' traits and
explain differences in international relations).
381. WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 13(1992).
382. See Rose Gottemoeller, Cooperative Inducements: Crafting New Tools for
Nonproliferation, in ULTIMATE SECURITY: COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS

151 (Janne E. Nolan, Bernard I. Finel & Brian D. Finlay, eds.,
2003) (considering the most effective way to transmit the threat reduction
experience to other parts of the world).
DESTRUCTION

383. See Global Technology Body to try to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism in
Kazakhstan, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., May 27, 2004.

384. See id. (citing research as the key to strengthening control over the
possession and transportation of nuclear materials).
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resolution to compel governments to criminalize the transfer of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon materials to terrorists,
Pakistan's ambassador to the U.N. declared flatly, "Pakistan will not
accept any demand for access, much less inspections, of our nuclear
and strategic assets, material, and facilities. 3 85 Launching a policy of
inclusion that expands the reach of the Global Partnership will not be
easy, but the G8 should adopt it as a goal. While one proposal has
suggested that member states pursue an NPT side agreement with
India, Pakistan, and Israel, the G8 should be even more ambitious.386
There is no choice but to work to include all nuclear states, not just
Pakistan, India, and Israel, but North Korea, Iran, and others.387 Such
expansion carries risk and likely will attract a level of political
opposition. It automatically raises the question of whether each of
these states, North Korea, Pakistan, and China in particular, are more
suitable as targets of threat reduction than partners.388 Each of these
higher risk states poses a risk of proliferation, although it is unknown
whether such activities are conducted with the authority of the
government or by freelancing officials within the government.389
Guaranteeing commitment from all of the nuclear states and
including them in the G8 partnership is essential to capturing these
states in a "closed system," building political momentum overseas,

385. Colum Lynch, Weapon Transfers Targeted, WASH. POST Apr. 8, 2004, at
A21.
386. See Avner Cohen & Thomas Graham, Jr., An NPT for Non-Members,
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 2004, at 40-4 (noting that this
proposal recognizes the nuclear statuses of these countries while requiring that they
commit
to
achieving
nonproliferation),
available
at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art offi=mj04cohen (last visited Apr. 8,

2005).

387. See Nunn & Flournoy, supra note 373 (highlighting the market for usable
nuclear material and inadequately protected nuclear material, thus creating a threat
of terrorist attacks on nuclear reactors all over the world).
388. See PERKOVICH, supra note 118, at 9 (noting that the NPT was imperfect,
but made all the states involved safer individually and collectively).
389. See, e.g., id. at 75 (raising questions about whether the United States can
trust the Pakistani government, which does not have an effective system for
identifying dangerous actors and inadequate policies).
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and multiplying existing efforts.39 ° Without such cooperation,
proliferation leaks coming from outside the circle of states currently
391 By
served will undermine the success of the entire project.
bringing these states into the threat reduction process, the G8 and its
affiliates can begin to establish a web of interrelated monitoring and
difficult for new entrants to divert
cooperation that will make it 3more
92
nuclear weapons or materials.
While each step of diplomacy naturally comes at a price, the G8
should be careful to ensure that expansion does not dilute the goals
of nonproliferation. Although it is challenging to simultaneously
bring in new parties and maintain coherence and direction, PSI is a
successful example of ensuring core principles are not compromised
by expansion.393 PSI displays how gathering the momentum of new

countries in a nonproliferation regime can strengthen and promote
the effort. 394 The key to successfully expanding PSI was the existing
partners' refusal to permit newcomers from deviating from the
agreed Statement of Principles. 395 The G8 expansion should operate
in the same manner-welcoming all nations on board that express
the willingness and ability to pursue the principles set forth in the
partnership.

390. See id. at 10-11 (noting the increase in international cooperation and the
corresponding decrease in the number of nuclear weapons and nations with nuclear
weapon programs than there were twenty years ago).
391. See id. at 12 (recognizing the existence of a small number of outlaw states
that disregard international norms and are intent on acquiring weapons of mass
destruction).
392. See Gottemoeller, supra note 382, at 150 (suggesting that the United States
engage other countries such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan that have been eager to
share their experience with threat reduction and nonproliferation).
393. See Bolton Outlines, supra note 81 (discussing PSI's successful
interception of the BBC China, which contained nuclear components bound for
Libya).
394. See id. (emphasizing the global pledge to preventing dangerous weapons
and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists).
395. See id. (highlighting the United States' recent assistance in Iraq and Libya
and its encouragement of its partners to undertake their own projects in states
worldwide).

